Translated from GegenStandpunkt 1-2019

Not only under Trump, but with new determination under Trump:

The American world power is pushing ahead with the disempowerment of its Russian rival

The strategic plans of the USA tend to attract little attention in public perception in this country. When Trump terminated the INF Treaty, there were brief fears that something could get out of hand and a new arms race could begin – as if the USA had ever slackened in its arms efforts. Yet it is common knowledge that it spends astronomical sums on its defense year after year. Trump’s repeated open messages to Putin that he does not even need to try to keep up with America’s arms build-up have also been noted. But such an announcement is not something that would raise concerns among the public here. After all, the majority of the public believes that Russia should be put in its place; in fact, they even doubt the reliability of this president because he is said to be all too naive about his alleged friend Putin. On the other hand, the accusations that Trump regularly makes against NATO partners, espcially the Germans, in connection with the financing of the arms effort, that they are sparing their budgets at the expense of the USA and are criminally neglecting the financial obligations they have entered into, cause a certain amount of concern. In contrast, the questions of what is actually being financed with all this money and why the United States is making such decisive progress on this front is of little public interest. The answers to these questions do not require a great deal of investigative effort; the official security policy documents of the USA state them in clear language.

I. The definition of Russia as a ‘rival’ of the USA – enemy image and enmity

The four military doctrines[1] commissioned by the Trump administration to evaluate the threats to US national security and define the necessary countermeasures differ from those of the previous administration in one key respect: terrorism, which was still the main threat to peace under Obama, has receded into the background in the current threat scenario, as has the threat from the rogue states Iran and North Korea; their place has been taken by strategic competition from the major powers China[2] and Russia:

“The central challenge to US prosperity and security is the reappearance of long-term strategic competition from revisionist powers, as classified in the National Security Strategy. It is becoming increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world that is consistent with their authoritarian model – and thus gain the authority to veto the economic, diplomatic and security decisions of other nations.” (NDS, p. 2)

These programmatic statements present a new situation: a return to a state of affairs that was thought to have been overcome with the end of the Soviet Union. They see the vital interests of the USA – “prosperity and security” – threatened by the (re)emergence of powers that want to shape the world in their own way and thus oppose the USA as competitors at the strategic level where questions of world order are raised and decided. The latter, the fact that these powers appear as competitors at all – that they pursue policies at the same level at which the USA acts as a world power with the utmost presumptuousness – suffices for the accusation of China and Russia and justifies the crime called “revisionism.” The accusation operates with the idea that these powers, because they are not ready to accept their rightful status in this world, want to reshape the world in their favor; a world that is well-ordered, in which every state has its well-defined place, and whose order is to be respected by the members of the family of states. Conversely, the status that the USA acquired after the end of the Soviet Union – that of the “only remaining superpower” – is presented as a rightful possession of the USA which must be secured by all means against unlawful access by this very world of states. The balance of power in the world of states, which the USA has decisively established in two successfully fought world wars, a Cold War against the leading real socialist power and its ‘bloc’ as well as through its continued efforts to further disempower its still far too powerful successor, is cited as the legal basis for the claim practiced by the USA of being able to exercise a regime over the rest of the world of states that comes pretty close to a global monopoly on the use of force. The unconditionality of this claim, that America is called upon to control the global balance of power and to defend it against the lack of respect shown by others for itself and the world order for which it stands, is justified on the one hand by pointing out that the “prosperity and security” of the USA stands or falls with the securing of this status. However, the strategic doctrine also lists other good reasons: America is acting not only in its own interests, but in the interests of the entire family of nations, upon which the ‘revisionists’ namely want to impose the evil “authoritarian model” they practice at home. China and Russia are characterized as powers whose foreign policy agenda consists of oppressing other nations and disregarding their sovereignty. Only the negative side of their policy remains; the exercise of violence both internally and externally is declared to be the content and purpose of their policy, and the fundamental and far-reaching nature of their reprehensible activities is emphasized with the “model” – today’s ideological substitute for the old systemic opposition, so to speak. In the case of these two states, they want nothing to do with political interests, which in the relationship between sovereign states constantly provide the reasons for “economic, diplomatic and security decisions of other nations” being ignored or rejected. For them, prosperity and security are nothing from which they could derive any legitimate need for action; these powers, as they are characterized, have no interests worthy of recognition at all.

This is how the official enemy image reads as an enmity that has different reasons than those presented with the enemy image; the enemy image is conversely based on the enmity that is declared to be the ‘revisionist powers’: the fact that these two states evade subordination to American supremacy is what earns them American enmity; America’s right to something like a worldwide monopoly on the use of force makes states that do not bow to this claim revisionists and violators of the law.

As for Russia, the US military doctrines concretize the revisionism of this nation with a catalog of sins that lists and puts in perspective everything Russia does in its near and distant neighborhood to protect its interests:

“Russia seeks veto authority over nations on its periphery in terms of their governmental, economic, and diplomatic decisions, to shatter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and change European and Middle East security and economic structures to its favor. The use of emerging technologies to discredit and subvert democratic processes in Georgia, Crimea, and eastern Ukraine is concern enough, but when coupled with its expanding and modernizing nuclear arsenal the challenge is clear.” (NDS, p. 2)

American military strategists assume that the USA can justifiably claim the entire world as its sphere of influence, so that it is therefore completely legitimate for it to work with its strategic partners in NATO and the EU to ensure that states are established and governments are in charge on Russia’s “periphery” that are aligned with NATO and the EU. Therefore, Russia’s efforts to secure its environment as its sphere of influence appear in their analysis as an illegitimate use of power per se and Russia itself as a power whose ‘power ambitions’ are incompatible with the legitimate interests of its neighbors. The way the cards are dealt in their analysis, Russia would have to accept the peaceful conquest of its environment by NATO and the EU, i.e. its strategic encirclement, unchallenged. If it does not do so, it is asserting a “veto authority” to which it is not entitled. Because, from the point of view of American strategists, it is only right and proper for NATO to pursue its expansion as a self-contained bloc of states committed to containing Russian power, Russia’s efforts to improve or even just maintain its relations with members of this alliance appear to be an attempt to “break up NATO.” If it opposes the NATO and EU program to break Ukraine out of its traditional ties and incorporate it into the EU; if, by annexing Crimea, it prevents the base of its Black Sea fleet from becoming untenable after Ukraine has been transferred to the Western camp; if its military intervention in the Middle East prevents the fall of its only remaining ally there – then it is Russia that is tampering with the established “structures” on which security and economic prosperity in Europe and the Middle East are based; then Russia is opposing anonymous “processes” that are simply underway and cannot be stopped, if only because they are advancing the good, democracy – particularly “in Georgia,” “Crimea” and “eastern Ukraine.”

All of this is “worrying enough” for the experts concerned with US national security. What makes Russia the ultimate challenge bar none for America in their eyes; what makes Russia stand out from the handful of larger and smaller rogue states that America has on its to-do list is the fact that this state still has a nuclear weapons arsenal, one which it is even expanding and modernizing, and with which it can even command America’s respect. The American military doctrines really emphasize this point as a unique selling point that makes Russia an intolerable rival in the world:

“The ICBM force is highly survivable against any but a large-scale nuclear attack. To destroy U.S. ICBMs on the ground, an adversary would need to launch a precisely coordinated attack with hundreds of high-yield and accurate warheads. This is an insurmountable challenge for any potential adversary today, with the exception of Russia.” (NPR, p. 46)

Russia is the only power in the world that can counteract the destructive potential that rests in America’s missile silos. For God’s Own Nation, this represents an unacceptable threat to the deterrent power with which it acts as a world power and makes policy towards the rest of the world. Russia, for its part, possesses and is acquiring with its nuclear arsenal the deterrent power that enables it to assert itself, to exert its influence on its periphery against the will of the USA, and to limit the ability of America and its allies to act there:

“Not only is Moscow expanding and modernizing its strategic offensive missile forces, it also is fielding an increasingly advanced and diverse range of nuclear-capable regional offensive missile systems that threaten deployed U.S. forces, allies, and partners. These missile systems are a critical enabler of Russia’s coercive escalation strategy and nuclear threats to U.S. allies and partners...Russia is developing a new generation of advanced, regional ballistic and cruise missiles that support its anti-access/area denial [3] strategy intended to defeat U.S. and allied will and capability in regional crises or conflicts. Indeed, Russia has demonstrated its advanced cruise missile capability since 2015 by repeatedly conducting long-range precision strikes into Syria.” (MDR, p. 18)

The USA leaves no doubt that it is doing everything it can to deal with this challenge. The matter is its “top priority.”

II. The USA closes gaps in a nuclear war scenario against Russia

1. Strategic realignment of the missile defense shield

Missile defense plays a key role in US strategic planning. The reason and purpose for this has not changed since Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The missile defense shield planned at that time was avowedly aimed at overcoming the stalemate in which the leading power of the capitalist West and the Soviet power, both armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons with x-fold overkill capacities, had been facing each other for decades. The situation, which was made known to humankind under the title ‘balance of terror’ and grotesquely interpreted as a means of preventing war and securing world peace, represented something completely different for American strategists, namely a dilemma that had to be overcome: The fact that both sides could threaten each other with devastating retaliatory strikes in the event that the other side used its nuclear weapons, i.e. that the use of these weapons was linked to the prospect of their own destruction for both sides, was seen by US strategic thinkers as a limitation on their own ability to wage war which had to be eliminated at all costs. At the time, the Americans envisaged the development and construction of a missile defense system that would give them the ability to neutralize enemy missile attacks, take the impact out of the threat of annihilation, and thus put them in a position to decide freely on the use of their own nuclear weapons.

Since the 1980s, the USA has resolutely pushed ahead with the development of such a missile defense system despite all the political ups and downs and the system question. Four decades and several trillion dollars later, it has an anti-missile system with which it has achieved interception rates of around 50% in tests. Even in this state, it is already undermining the basis for calculating the enemy’s strategic plans: it no longer knows how much its ultimate means of war is (still) worth if worse comes to worse.

This is by no means satisfactory for the USA. President Trump has given his military groundbreaking guidelines –

“Our goal is simple: to ensure that we can detect and destroy any missile launched against the United States – anywhere, anytime, any place” (Trump presenting the Missile Defense Review, January 17, 2019) – ,

and his administration's Missile Defense Review, published in 2019, presents the program for the future design of missile defense, which is based on these ambitious targets:

“The United States will field, maintain, and integrate three different means of missile defense to identify and exploit every practical opportunity to detect, disrupt, and destroy a threatening missile prior to and after its launch. These include: first, active missile defense to intercept adversary missiles in all phases of flight; second, passive defense to mitigate the potential effects of offensive missiles; and third, if deterrence fails, attack operations to defeat offensive missiles prior to launch.” (MDR, p. x)[4]

The currently active missile defense against attacks on the homeland is based on a Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System (GMD), which destroys enemy missiles in the midcourse phase of flight: infrared satellites detect the launch of the missile, ground radar stations track the flight path, interceptor missiles transport a kill vehicle into space, which eliminates the missile carrier and/or the warhead through the kinetic energy of the impact.

To increase the success rate achieved with this system to date, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is renewing its interceptor missiles, improving their effectiveness by increasing their speed, equipping them with a new multi-object kill vehicle (MOKV) and introducing a new destruction strategy,[5] increasing their number by half and also considering the construction of a new interceptor station on the east coast of the USA.

The US Navy is commanding a second active missile defense system in the form of a huge fleet of Aegis guided missile cruisers and destroyers. This fleet forms a combat-strong floating complement to the GMD on the world’s oceans, consolidates the defensive shield constituted by the GMD and is capable, alone or in conjunction with identical ships from allies in Spain, Norway, South Korea, Japan and Australia as well as Aegis bases stationed on land in Romania, Japan and, by 2020 at the latest, in Poland, of setting up a regional defensive shield in every corner of the world at any time to safeguard the US military’s freedom of operation. [6] A third defense system called Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), stationed in the homeland, South Korea, Guam, Germany and, according to MDA plans, soon with allies worldwide, attacks enemy projectiles in the final phase of their flight and supplements the network for monitoring the global war zone with its radar, which has a range of a thousand kilometers. Fourthly, there is the Patriot defense system, deployed in enormous numbers in many countries, which has a much shorter range than the other systems and operates primarily against enemy aircraft, cruise missiles and tactical missiles.

Passive defense includes measures to harden missile silos and command bunkers and to strengthen the resilience of military and other infrastructure. It serves to reduce the vulnerability of a country’s own nuclear arsenal to nuclear strikes.

From the point of view of absolute invulnerability, all active missile defense systems deployed to date suffer from the shortcoming that they only target the enemy missiles as a threat to be combated once they have been launched, that the threat can then possibly no longer be fully countered – especially in the case of intercontinental missiles equipped with ten or more independently guided warheads (MIRV, MARV) and dummy warheads – and that the countermeasures themselves cause damage to one’s own territory if the missile is shot down in the final phase of its flight. In addition, the American military planners take into account the progress that Russia has made in missile development:

“Russian offensive missile modernization programs go well beyond traditional ballistic missiles, to include missiles with unprecedented characteristics of altitude, speed, propulsion type, and range.” (MDR, p. 18)

They are talking here about missiles and cruise missiles with hypersonic speeds, non-ballistic, i.e. difficult to unpredictable trajectories, etc.

The MDR 2019 therefore announces a reorientation of the defense strategy: In the future, the focus of active missile defense “will be [placed] on offensive operations to disrupt offensive missiles before launch.” The plan is to perfect the defense by means of ‘forward defense’ at the enemy’s launch pads, which until then had been considered unrealizable, nipping the enemy’s latest potential in the bud alongside its outdated potential – and thus ensuring that Moscow is sure to miscalculate if it expects to gain strategic advantages with the introduction of a new generation of offensive weapons.

2. The perfection of missile defense poses new challenges for space warfare

2.1 The theater of war in space

Control of the orbit from the stratosphere to the exosphere is of crucial importance for nuclear warfare and modern warfare in general. Satellites that can be positioned anywhere in space provide the military command with the necessary reconnaissance over what is in principle a global battlefield; of particular importance here is the location of mobile launch pads for land-based nuclear missiles and the detection of missile launches by Space-Based Infrared System Satellites, which detect the heat generated during launch.

Because satellites are not only essential for reconnaissance, but also for targeting and controlling weapons systems, securing communication on networked battlefields – and of course also the communication structures for maintaining the social life process and the functioning of state rule – the few hand-picked potent superpowers have managed not only to populate the cosmos with hundreds of these useful little satellites, but also to turn it into a veritable battlefield. There are anti-satellite missiles, ground- or air-based, which can destroy objects even at an altitude of 850 km; maneuverable satellites that can examine and repair other satellites, but can also be used as SUMOs (Spacecraft for the Unmanned Modification of Orbits) to knock enemy satellites off course or render them inoperable; and radio jamming systems. The use of space debris, generated for example by fragmentation bombs, is also said to be useful for eliminating enemy missiles.

Strong electromagnetic pulses are in the repertoire for disrupting or destroying the enemy’s communication systems and many other things –

“The EMP can disrupt or destroy all electronically supported machines from airplanes to pacemakers, it endangers the central systems of broadcasting, rescue services, hospitals, energy supply and rail transport – with corresponding danger for the warning system, patient care and evacuations” (Wikipedia, Electromagnetic pulse) –,

caused by a thermonuclear explosion of the right height and the right strength. The right measure is of crucial importance here, so that you do not also blind yourself and so that the desired effect is not accompanied by too much of the unavoidable other effects and the radioactive fallout does not cause more damage to enemy and friend than you have planned as the price of victory. Of course, modern war technicians are working hard to overcome this problem and are doing their best to supplement their tools for blinding the enemy by setting up a non-satellite-based navigation and communication system that is available to their own forces in any (war) situation because it cannot be disrupted by electromagnetism.

2.2 A new infrastructure in space for nuclear war in the 21st century

The MDR explains what needs to be done to implement the new three-stage comprehensive missile defense strategy with forward defense at the silos of Russian nuclear missiles in space:

“The exploitation of space provides a missile defense posture that is more effective, resilient and adaptable to known and unanticipated threats. Space-based sensors, for example, can monitor, detect and track missile launches from locations almost anywhere on the globe – they enjoy a measure of flexibility of movement that is unimpeded by the constraints that geographic limitations impose on terrestrial sensors. In addition, unlike land-based sensors, space sensors do not require basing rights or agreements with foreign states. This enables them to be placed where necessary to achieve the ideal viewing geometry for launch detection, missile tracking, threat discrimination, and intercept detection/kill assessment of missile threats to the U.S. homeland, our forces abroad and to our allies and partners. Such ‘birth to death’ tracking of incoming missile threats from space is extremely advantageous. Missile defense sensors in space also possess inherent capabilities for other essential missions, including theater missile warning and technical intelligence. The unique benefits and attributes of space sensors … may extend to the basing of defensive interceptors in space. For example, the space-basing of interceptors may provide the opportunity to engage offensive missiles in their most vulnerable initial boost phase of flight ... Space basing may increase the overall likelihood of successfully intercepting offensive missiles, reduce the number of U.S. defensive interceptors required to do so, and potentially destroy offensive missiles over the attacker’s territory rather than the targeted state.” (MDR, p. 36-7)

What is being called for under the heading of a “more effective and adaptable missile defense” is a satellite network that is firstly capable of detecting the launch of enemy projectiles “from almost anywhere in the world”; keep a constant eye on them from launch, at whatever flight speed and on whatever trajectory, ballistic or non-ballistic, until they are destroyed (“Birth-to-Death” tracking) – and from all militarily relevant angles (“ideal visual geometry”); secondly, which also has the ability to destroy the missile from space. Thirdly, it should transmit the collected data so quickly that enemy attacks in any regional theater of war can be countered in good time.

Fourthly, the demand for greater resilience of the entire required space infrastructure on the earth’s surface and in space could hardly be higher:

“The United States must have an NC3 [Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications] system that provides control of U.S. nuclear forces at all times, even under the enormous stress of a nuclear attack. NC3 capabilities must assure the integrity of transmitted information and possess the resiliency and survivability necessary to reliably overcome the effects of nuclear attack.” (NPR, p. XIII)

In their nuclear war scenario, US strategists firmly assume that they will have to withstand a few Russian nuclear strikes, but that these must not significantly impair their own war-fighting capability: NC3 for the use of American nuclear weapons must be maintained in any case, even in a nuclear war.

The existing network of earth-based radar stations of the USA and its allies in all parts of the world is by far the largest collection of satellites in space – between 600 and 1000 satellites are mentioned – and does not meet these requirements. This network can and must be improved, and there is also a determined insistence on more efforts in this regard by the 'allies' and more interoperability: this should help “to negate missile threats while minimizing gaps and seams in U.S. led regional defense architectures.” (MDR, p. 36).

In addition, the effectiveness, adaptability and resilience required for nuclear war against an opponent like Russia today literally demands a new development of space. Accordingly, the US government is taking a thorough approach:

– It is establishing new military units – for the first time since 1947, a new branch of the armed forces to be called the Space Force or Space Corps, as well as a smaller Space Development Agency – and equipping them with a fairly open-ended budget[7] and a mandate, to secure the USA absolute control over the enemy’s missile weapons in space[8] and to ensure the destruction of so many offensive missiles in the launch phase that active missile defense no longer has much to intercept – in limited warfare in regional theaters of war as well as in global nuclear war – in order to guarantee its own nuclear triad freedom of action at all times.

– The “proliferated low-Earth orbit sensor and communications transport layer” (defensedaily, March 13, 2019) is a completely new “layer” of satellites in space consisting of hundreds of micro- and nano- satellites that are positioned much closer to the earth than the previous missile defense satellites in order to be able to detect the trajectories of the new generation of missiles, and in such large numbers that the network remains functional even under extreme conditions.
– Prompt strike capabilities for offensive missile defense. In order to be able to destroy enemy missiles from launch from space or with earth-based weapons, the USA is planning to test several weapon systems which have reached the stage of readiness for use after lengthy research and development, in parallel with “additional emphasis,” i.e. regardless of the costs, and make them suitable for the battlefield. These prompt strike capabilities include
– Earth-stationed offensive weapons: a Tactical Boost Glider, launched into space by a long-range bomber and rocket boosters and accelerated to hypersonic speed, is to destroy its target with the high kinetic energy given at this speed; a Hypersonic Air-Breathing Weapon, a projectile that does not operate as a glider but reaches hypersonic speed using its own engine, is to perform the same service; both are to be airworthy by the end of 2019;[9]
– Laser weapons, which are mainly deployed on aircraft, drones or satellites stationed close to the earth. [10]
– The fifth-generation stealth fighter aircraft has already entered service. As a flying command center, it provides all relevant information in real time and, armed with new, faster missiles, should be able to neutralize enemy missiles during the launch phase. [11]

*

Given the eminent military importance of the outer layers of the blue planet, the American vice president’s indignation at the fact that his opponents are also spreading their wings there is all too understandable:

“For many years, nations from Russia and China to North Korea and Iran have pursued weapons to jam, blind, and disable our navigation and communications satellites via electronic attacks from the ground... In 2007, China launched a missile that tracked and destroyed one of its own satellites — a highly provocative demonstration of China’s growing capability to militarize space. Russia has been designing an airborne laser to disrupt our space-based system. And it claims to be developing missiles that can be launched from an aircraft mid-flight to destroy American satellites. Both China and Russia have been conducting highly sophisticated on-orbit activities that could enable them to maneuver their satellites into close proximity of ours, posing unprecedented new dangers to our space systems.” (Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Future of the U.S. Military in Space, August 9, 2019)

The fact that Russia and China have the means to get involved in space seems so outrageous to the man that he forgets that his nation has more military satellites orbiting the earth than all other states combined in order to do away with the complaint that “our adversaries have been working to bring new weapons of war into space itself.” (Pence, ibid.)

If other powers can endanger America in space, then they are taking the war into the cosmos and forcing the USA to restore order. The Vice President, like his boss, simply knows no other measure of American military power than absolute freedom of action through unchallenged superiority, and enforcing this position secures – what else – peace in the world:

“The Vice President emphasized that America is also a force for peace in space. The Space Force will carry America's values into the ‘new frontier’.” (NZZ, August 10, 2018)

3. Renewal of the nuclear triad and security in cyberspace

The enormous progress made in missile defense, which is already giving the American leadership the idea that it might be possible to destroy every incoming projectile, opens up to the US military – not the monopoly on the use of nuclear weapons that it is striving for with all its might, but: – an unprecedented freedom in the calculation with this top category means of destruction.

In the opinion of experts, it is very outdated and has somehow been kept functional – but is simply no longer state of the art:

“Our nuclear deterrent is nearing a crossroads. To date, we have preserved this deterrent by extending the lifespan of legacy nuclear forces and infrastructure – in many cases for decades beyond what was originally intended ... In fact, we are now at a point where we must concurrently modernize the entire nuclear triad and the infrastructure that enables its effectiveness.” (NPR, p. 41) “The United States will replace its strategic nuclear triad and sustain the warheads it carries – there is no higher priority for national defense.” (NPR, p. 48)

The modernization program aims to increase the USA’s nuclear power in two ways: Firstly, it is about increasing the efficiency of the killing device, which parameters such as targeting accuracy and precision during detonation are important for; improvements in this field allow the military to achieve the desired effect with a smaller number of weapons and reduced explosive charges, to dose the various effects of the nuclear explosion – heat, pressure, radioactivity – so masterfully that nuclear weapons also serve well on the battlefield and that the large-scale nuke also results in a controlled, functional destruction of the enemy’s war resources in terms of type and scope, and not simply fields of rubble.

One of the most important innovations in this field is a firing mechanism that improves the efficiency of the most common warhead in the US armed forces, deployed on nuclear submarines and land-based missiles, to such an extent that it achieves the same destructive effect as the most powerful warheads of the intercontinental missiles in the US arsenal, which were necessary to destroy the specially hardened silos of the Russian intercontinental missiles before the invention of these super-fuzes. This means that the massive mutual reduction in land-based strategic missiles agreed in the START and New START disarmament treaties is becoming a one-sided advantage for the USA: With the warheads modernized by the super fuse in addition to the nuclear charges mounted on their largest MX Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missiles, they have around 400 nuclear warheads with the same destructive effect at their disposal, which gives the military leadership the possibility of eliminating the entire land-based component of the Russian triad in a first strike with 20% of their nuclear weapons. [12]

Secondly, the aim is to get the weapons reliably on target. To this end, the mobility of the launchers is being increased, the ability to launch safely even under the most adverse conditions is being refined, the preparation for launch is being shortened to a matter of seconds, and launchers are being developed that can reach their target at hypersonic speed and on non-ballistic trajectories so that the enemy has no opportunity to localize the threat and react.

Needless to say, the decided armament – according to the principle: “The size of our force matters” – also reaches new dimensions in quantitative terms: Over the next few years, the entire currently active nuclear submarine fleet will be replaced by quieter and faster ships with new ballistic missiles; the Air Force and Navy will receive 2,500 of the aforementioned nuclear-capable stealth fighter aircraft; almost one billion US dollars is being invested to make the aging, too slow and therefore too vulnerable B-52 strategic bomber fleet – famous for its carpet bombing in the Vietnam War – fit for the future with a new, nuclear-capable cruise missile that can be fired from greater distances; at the same time, the development of a next-generation nuclear-capable bomber is being driven forward, with deployment planned for the mid-2020s. The land-based part of the triad is being completely renewed as part of the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program: modernization of the launchers, deployment of 400 new intercontinental missiles.

The US Air Force has also come up with an older, rather primitive means of warfare, but one that has no side effects, so to speak, and whose destructive effect is equivalent to a nuclear bomb strike: the dropping of tungsten rods weighing several tons from space, which, due to the high density of the material, can survive re-entry into the atmosphere without major loss of mass and can be used to destroy particularly hardened targets. [13]

But as a new generation of nuclear weapons is introduced, their vulnerability also increases:

“Last September, the Air Force Science Board released a major study into “surety” for next-generation nuclear weapons — that is, making sure that control networks can’t be incapacitated or, worse, made to convey incorrect information. The board, which hadn’t certified a nuclear program since the B-2 bomber, found that surety has become a bigger task in the era of interconnected weapons. Board chair James Chow noted that the United States is about to build many new weapons and pieces of equipment, including a new bomber, new ICBMs, and new nuclear cruise missiles. ‘These nuclear systems are increasingly reliant on cyber-enabled components.’” (As America’s Nukes and Sensors Get More Connected, the Risk of Cyber Attack Is Growing, P. Tucker, Defense One, January 17, 2018)

And because the principle applies:

“If you can’t be sure that your nuclear response has not been hacked, then you aren’t effectively deterring anything. And that’s the only reason to have nuclear weapons” (ibid.) –

and because cyberspace has become a battlefield in its own right, where foreign powers threaten the nation’s entire digital life, America is establishing a new force called the Cyber Mission Force, which, with a few thousand men, will secure its “freedom to operate in cyberspace” – in other words, ensure a completely resilient NC3, a protected network at home and the opposite for the enemy.[14]

There is also the threat that hacker attacks against any member of NATO will in the future be considered acts of war, bringing the entire alliance into action:

“Hybrid threats. Should a member be attacked using hybrid warfare, NATO reserves the right to declare an alliance with a mutual assistance obligation, as in the case of an armed attack. The Baltic states close to the Russian border are particularly vulnerable to hybrid attacks. These are primarily cyber attacks in which the attackers are no longer visible as state actors.” (NATO Summit final declaration, July 12, 2018)

4. Perfecting the encirclement of Russia

Over the past 30 years, the USA has consistently pursued the strategic goal of isolating Russia as a land power, transforming former Soviet territories, allies and neighboring states into NATO members and thus creating a war threat directly on its borders, and has now come much closer to achieving this goal. The ensemble of NATO powers now includes the Baltic and Central and Eastern European states, the former strategic front of the Soviet Union; and in the north, not only NATO member Norway, but also non-members such as Sweden and Finland are aligning their military policy with the Alliance.[15]

Even under Obama, the USA’s aim was to strengthen its ‘forward presence’ on Russia's western and southern flanks[16] or, to put it in less military-diplomatic terms, to build up its own war front in Europe, which poses an existential threat to the Kremlin:

“Back then [2014], under the name ‘European Reassurance Initiative’ (ERI), Washington initially provided 985 million US dollars for an expanded military presence on the European continent. This included increased maneuvers in Eastern and Southeastern Europe and the so-called forward stationing of all types of military equipment – the storage of weapons and other items in Europe so that in the event of war only the corresponding troops would have to be flown in. The US administration ultimately combined the activities in Eastern and Southeastern Europe in Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR). As part of this operation, a US combat brigade is now constantly on the move in the Baltic states and Poland, as well as in Romania and Bulgaria, to carry out all types of war exercises with the local armed forces. The combat brigade is rotated every nine months. Since 2014, Washington – Obama or Trump – has systematically increased the funds for the ERI, which has since been renamed the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI). While the EDI funds already reached the value of 4.8 billion US dollars in 2018, they are to be increased to 6.5 billion US dollars next year. Around 50 percent are earmarked for the ‘forward stationing’ of large equipment. According to Major i.G. Lange, the US Army will then, in addition to its regular units, keep ‘material and equipment for two armored combat brigades (consisting of a total of 9,000 soldiers with 180 combat vehicles and 180 infantry fighting vehicles), two artillery brigades, forces for air defense, engineering, logistics and transport tasks as well as medical services' in Europe.’” (Junge Welt, July 6, 2018)

What NATO is deploying with a large number of small, powerful troops – NATO Response Force, 40,000 men; Very Rapid Reaction Force, 5,000 men; “four 30s readiness program: 30 air squadrons, 30 ships and 30 battalions ready to be employed in under 30 days”[17] – together with heavy weapons permanently deployed on the Russian border, are armed forces with a combined strength of several divisions, which, according to Obama’s specifications, provide the Russian leadership with a permanent invasion threat from the Baltics to the Black Sea.

From the Baltic states, NATO not only has a nice new deployment area for its army in north-western Russia; from them, it controls the Baltic coast as far as St. Petersburg and the airspace in the region; its change of sides makes Russian Kaliningrad, the Baltic Fleet’s only remaining largely ice-free access to the Baltic Sea, an exclave surrounded by NATO states in a militarily sensitive position. Looking at it the other way around, however, NATO’s forward positions become particularly vulnerable objects of Russian aggression: Russia could use the so-called Suwalki Gap to separate the Baltic States from Poland, which would of course require additional defense measures in both regions.

So Poland is not only home to one of the two European missile sites for the American defense shield, but also a few thousand men from the NATO forces stationed up front, including heavy equipment, and soon, if Trump succumbs to Poland’s wooing, an extra division of the US armed forces. The determined enemies of Russia in Warsaw are investing more than NATO demands in the rearmament of their military and are buying more and more American weapons – bringing the USA a good deal closer to its ideal of “interoperability” between the armed forces of its various allies, i.e. the ideal of treating these armed forces as homogeneous components of an overall force led by it, even in the East, which has so far been equipped with the wrong weapons. [18]

Further down in southern Europe, the post-Yugoslav republics, with the exception of Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, have been completely liberated from Russian influence and, thanks to robust American interference in the internal affairs of Montenegro and Macedonia, two of the remaining problem cases have also been assigned to the alliance or have already been stowed away in it, which clarifies the balance of power around the Mediterranean in a pleasing way. Kosovo, home to one of the largest US air force bases abroad, is also making a significant contribution to this; if the country transforms its terrorist militia from the war against the rest of Yugoslavia into a recognized national army, which the US is encouraging it to do, promising a lot of money and the supply of its fine weapons, it will also have a loyal, extremely interoperable vassal force of 5,000 men under its command at the base. America also has the necessary air force bases in the Eastern Balkans for the military domination of South Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region; in Romania, it also has the second component of its missile defense shield and a decidedly anti-Russian partner, which, like the poster boy Poland, is happy to spend a lot of money – 3.3 billion euros are planned – to be equipped with the Patriot air and missile defense system. [19]

On Russia’s western border, the US has made a strategic dream come true, transforming Ukraine into an anti-Russian frontline state that is gradually being equipped with US weapons, trained and integrated into NATO. [20] This new partner is particularly valuable because Russia is losing a huge piece of strategic territory and the threat to its European heartland in particular is growing; because Russia is losing the traditional division of labor between the two ex-Soviet republics in terms of armaments and has to replace it with its own efforts; because the transformed Ukraine is making war against Russia its raison d'être and providing its large neighbor permanent conflicts in the Donbass and the Black and Azov Seas which demand a great deal of unwelcome economic and military expenditure and constantly bring with them the risk of escalation into a major war. [21] As a Black Sea neighbor, Ukraine secures the USA a further zone of influence on Russia’s southern border which, according to the same logic as the Suwalki Gap, is once again highly endangered by Russian aggression. Experts are getting carried away with extrapolations that strictly follow the logic that the bad guys can be trusted to do anything.

“Russia’s objectives in blocking access to the Sea of Azov are several, and are part of Moscow’s deliberate efforts to consolidate its hold over Crimea and ring-fence much of the Black Sea, a Russian strategic obsession since the late 17th century....Longer term, some see Russia angling to control a land corridor between Russia and the annexed Crimean peninsula, possibly even extending control as far west as Transnistria, the breakaway region of Moldova. ‘If the West’s reaction is too weak, the idea is to cut off Ukraine from the Black Sea and leave it a rump state,’ said Ariel Cohen, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council” (Foreign Policy, November 26, 2018) –,

and then openly reveal their obsession:

“China manufactures, arms, and fortifies artificial islands to uphold its maritime claims. Russia is leveraging its control of a vital strait. Given time and sufficient physical strength, the Chinese-Russian entente may rewrite the rules governing seaborne endeavors in both Southeast Asia and the Black Sea basin. They could forbid surveillance flights, naval flight operations, underwater surveys, and a host of other activities permitted under the law of the sea. That would leave Western forces unfamiliar with potential battlegrounds—and thus at a marked disadvantage in future conflicts.” (Foreign Policy, November 29, 2018)

Victory in a possible war belongs to the Western forces without any ifs and buts, and it is sensible for them to not win it at home, but on the enemy’s territory, which must therefore of course be known, so that it contradicts all rights ...

To protect these sacred rights and the freedom of Christian seafaring in general, NATO allows itself a permanent presence in the operational area of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, patrols there 100-120 days a year according to its own statements, conducts maneuvers, monitors the airspace in the region as a self-appointed guardian of order via “air policing” and generally does its best to repair the weak point on NATO’s south-eastern flank. [22] In the meantime, it also considers it a matter of course to deploy Aegis destroyers there, which allow it to eavesdrop far into Russia and, together with the missile defense positions set up on land, to set up a powerful regional defense shield at any time. [23]

It goes without saying that NATO’s south-eastern flank also includes the Caucasus state and Black Sea neighbor Georgia, which it needs to close its security gaps and is therefore preparing for membership in its club, despite repeated warnings from the Russian leadership that this expansion would have “catastrophic consequences” (Prime Minister Medvedev).

A little further to the south-east, on the Caspian Sea, in the “soft underbelly of Russia,” as strategists like to say, Azerbaijan’s relations with NATO have already progressed to membership of the Partnership for Peace and all kinds of arms deals with the USA. In Central Asia, the USA has been working more or less intensively for years on Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, some of which are in alliances with Russia, to join the right camp. So far, there has not been more than the temporary use of bases for the war in Afghanistan in terms of military cooperation, but at least enough has been achieved that there can be no question of these partners being reliable for Russia. In addition, for a few years now, the Americans have been making a new attempt to soften the dominance of China and Russia in the region; perhaps the ‘C5+1’-format, “a platform for dialog and cooperation between the five Central Asian states and the USA,” will also help to change the polarity of this part of the Russian Federation’s Middle East.

In the Far East, on Russia’s Pacific coast, Japan is arming itself tremendously, whether or not it is limiting itself to a defensive army. [24] The fact that this arms build-up is directed primarily against China will be no consolation to Russia and is also not the whole truth; after all, there has been a dispute between Japan and Russia over the Kuril Islands since the Second World War, which has lost none of its irreconcilability to this day. [25] In any case, with the planned conversion of two helicopter carriers into aircraft carriers and their equipping with the newly developed vertical take-off stealth fighters from the USA, Japan is moving up into the premier league of naval powers. For the supplier of the aircraft, who is also allowed to deliver a few dozen of this type with different specifications to the Japanese air force, this is a real stroke of luck in terms of interoperability: this modernization of the Japanese navy and air force gives the USA, which already has a huge military base in Okinawa, a powerful brother in arms that is completely geared towards it and two further platforms for expanding its military control in the Pacific and for better combating the Russian Pacific fleet stationed in Vladivostok and Kamchatka with its nuclear submarines. And that’s not all: Japan is also closing the gap in the Aegis missile defense system on the eastern flank of the Russian Empire. [26]

The US architects are still missing two building blocks to complete their forward defense that encompasses the whole of Russia: military control of the Arctic, Russia’s northern flank, and control of the world’s oceans, especially the North Atlantic.

The Arctic is becoming the focus of American war planning because climate change is opening up a new area of naval warfare against Russia. The US Navy expects to have a more or less ice-free operational area off the longest stretch of coast of the Russian Federation in the next few years, which will of course have to be occupied. A brand new fleet is being set up for this purpose –

“We are building a fleet from scratch and we have the unique chance to make it different, to make it right and fit for its purpose” (New Second Fleet To Stay Lean, Unpredictable, Commander Says; & Watching China, Paul McLeary, breakingdefense.com, November 29, 2018) –

and the possibility of a naval base in the Bering Strait “explored.”[27]

One purpose for which a new fleet is needed in addition to the existing ten aircraft carrier battle groups is to combat the Russian nuclear submarines stationed in the North Sea, which carry the bulk of Russia’s sea-based nuclear strike force, close to their home ports on the Kola Peninsula. The other is to deny this fleet access to the great seas as well, in this case access to its actual operational area in the Atlantic. In addition to neutralizing the Kremlin’s underwater cruisers, this is of the utmost importance for the USA because – as already mentioned several times – it does not want to fight the conflict with its rivals on its own territory:

“After all, it does not matter how capable, how well-trained or how advanced a nation's forces are if they can't get to the front in time. As the United States gears up for its looming battle with Russia and China, logistical concerns will naturally be front and center in the minds of the country's military planners.” (Stratfor, December 17, 2018)

It is clear as day to these strategists that the front must be on the Eurasian landmass, and it is therefore also clear that the necessary means of war must be transported there smoothly if the war is to be won. From this point of view, war planning, which assumes in all freedom that the United States can be largely shielded from the unpleasant effects of the impending war, becomes a battle with the tyranny of distance –

“The United States is blessed with a geography that has given it two wide oceans to guard its flanks, insulating it from many direct challenges to the homeland. But the same isolation that helps protect the United States also becomes a tyranny of distance when it comes to the U.S. military's ability to project force on the Eurasian landmass” (Stratfor, December 17, 2018) –,

because the enemy can impede or even prevent the essential projection of power:

“At present, in any case, the Russian navy is too small to sustain an anti-shipping campaign of this magnitude or to threaten America’s and NATO’s domination of the open seas. But with its new high quality submarine force, coupled with the ability to launch cruise missiles, the Russian Navy is still in a position to deny access to Europe across the North Atlantic. Northern Europe has surprisingly few seaports and airports through which large NATO troop contingents and equipment can be channeled to respond to Russian aggression. They are all well within the estimated 1500 mile range of [Russian] Kalibr missiles fired from the Norwegian Sea or the North Sea, well north of the GIUK gap.” (How Russia’s Sub-Launched Missiles Threaten NATO’s Wartime Strategy, M. Nordenman, Defense One, September 10, 2018)

An embarrassment that only goes to show that the Russian navy must be deprived of the ability to jeopardize the logistics of the USA and its allies in the North Atlantic from its home waters and to operate in the Atlantic at all. From the point of view of comprehensive, unchallenged control of this world ocean, experts are unanimous that the Atlantic approaches between Greenland, Iceland and Great Britain represent a single security gap (GIUK Gap), against which once again only one thing can help – guaranteed dominance:

“With these array of problems to consider, the United States is seeking solutions to ensure its forces and their equipment arrive in Eurasia during a crisis. To ensure greater coordination and unity of effort, NATO is establishing two new commands. The U.S.-based Atlantic Command will focus on coordinating allied efforts to facilitate access across the North Atlantic, while the Germany-based Logistics Command will ensure that U.S. troops arriving in Europe, as well as allied troops already stationed there, will experience no difficulty in rapidly deploying to the front. In addition, the United States also re-established the 2nd Fleet in July to guarantee [!] U.S. naval dominance in the North Atlantic.” (Stratfor, December 17, 2018)

This means that the strategic encirclement of Russia is pretty much complete and Russia is surrounded by countries in which America and its allies are pressing ahead with their military build-up and closing every “security gap” they discover in their advance.

5. A second nuclear war front against Russia in Europe

Despite all the progress made on their own arms buildup and containment of the Russian Federation, US strategists still see one “significant advantage” for their opponent in one type of weapon that needs to be eliminated:

“Russia possesses significant advantages in its nuclear weapons production capacity and in non-strategic nuclear forces over the U.S. and allies. It is also building a large, diverse, and modern set of non-strategic systems that are dual-capable (may be armed with nuclear or conventional weapons). These theater- and tactical-range systems are not accountable under the New START Treaty [the treaty refers exclusively to intercontinental ballistic missiles and has nothing to do with theater- and tactical range systems] and Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons modernization is increasing the total number of such weapons in its arsenal, while significantly improving its delivery capabilities. This includes the production, possession, and flight testing of a ground-launched cruise missile in violation of the INF Treaty. Moscow believes these systems may provide useful options for escalation advantage.” (NPR, p. 9) “Correcting this mistaken Russian perception is a strategic imperative.” (NPR, p. 54)

In the field of nuclear and conventional land-based short and medium-range missiles, the Kremlin has acquired a potential that gives it the freedom to militarily control conflicts in its immediate vicinity – in war terms: “theater and tactical range.” To describe the Russian leadership’s political calculations with these military advantages as mere “faith” and “misguided perception” is a radical declaration of war: the USA is announcing that it will do everything in its power to get a grip on this potential in such a way that any calculation with it becomes delusional.

US strategists are fully aware of the confrontation that is being opened up and the caliber of weapons to be deployed: they know best that the build-up of tactical nuclear weapons is Russia’s ‘answer’ to its progressive constriction in the Eurasian theater of war, the counterweight to the overwhelming conventional superiority of the USA and its allies. This missile power is the Kremlin’s means of asserting itself on its western front.

This is precisely why it must be denied the use of this means at all costs:

“Russia must ... understand that nuclear first-use, however limited, will fail to achieve its objectives, fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict, and trigger incalculable and intolerable costs for Moscow. Our strategy will ensure Russia understands that any use of nuclear weapons, however limited, is unacceptable.” (NPR, p. 30)

In order to threaten Russia with unacceptable damage in the use of its nuclear weapons to secure its strategic forward area in Europe, America is expanding the long-standing independent, second nuclear war threat on the old continent and explicitly linking it to the threat of annihilation by the strategic missile power in the USA:

“The United States will make available its strategic nuclear forces, and commit nuclear weapons forward-deployed to Europe, to the defense of NATO. These forces provide an essential political and military link between Europe and North America and are the supreme guarantee of Alliance security. Combined with the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, as well as Allied burden sharing arrangements, NATO’s overall nuclear deterrence forces are essential to the Alliance’s deterrence and defense posture now and in the future.” (NPR, p. 36)

With the “essential political and military link between Europe and North America,” the combination of NATO nuclear war capability in Europe and its own strategic clout behind it, the United States presents its enemy with its singular nuclear escalation dominance: the ability and will to respond to any Russian use of nuclear weapons, “however limited,” with superior means of war, from regional war to nuclear world war.

The USA is preparing its European pillar accordingly. Many useful tools of war, which it has long since dumped, are being increased and brought up to the latest state of war technology: sea- and air-based tactical nuclear weapons at their exclusive disposal on and around the European continent; tactical nuclear weapons for the air forces of their NATO partners in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium, which are being ‘modernized’ so that their destructive power reaches a new “strategic” level. [28] The “independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France” are, of course, an integral part of the American strategic calculus, independent or not.

Added to this is the dual use offered by the new missile defense positions in Romania and Poland, which can be equipped not only with interceptor missiles but also with cruise missiles which, according to experts, gives the USA a few hundred additional nuclear options. [29]

Although the military clout this creates gives the USA a new quality of battlefield domination against Russia on the Eurasian continent, it does not give its strategists any peace of mind. It remains the case that Russia has advantages in land-based short and medium-range missiles and that it could therefore force the USA’s hand at the lowest level in a section of a nuclear war scenario, in short: that the world power still lacks absolute, continuous escalatory dominance.

When America sets out to close this gap in the continuum of its power and to establish uncontested superiority in land-based tactical nuclear weapons by rearming in Europe, following the example of the Reagan era with its Pershings, it is not simply neutralizing the Kremlin’s “advantages,” but confronting it with a new threat of nuclear annihilation from European soil. It is developing the necessary means of war without being hindered by any arms control agreements with Russia. The INF Treaty is terminated with a few vague references to breaches of the treaty by the other side, and the expert dialog offered by Russia is refused. The rest of its arms diplomacy consists of the ultimate demand for unilateral Russian disarmament.

Work on the new nuclear weapons required for the European theater of war has been going on for years, as the American military freely admits:

“Anticipating [!] that the U.S. may pull out of the INF treaty with Russia, the Army already has been talking to industry partners about the possibility of extending the range of a key missile they’re developing so that it could travel farther than the treaty's limits allow. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty banned ground-based ballistic missiles with a range of 500 to 5,000 kilometers. The Army’s longest-ranging ground missile, the Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, falls well beneath that limit with a range of about 180 miles. But the Army has been looking to field a new, longer-range missile, called the Precision Strike Missile, or PrSM, by 2023. Because of the INF treaty, the current PrSM program is very specific on the range, 499 kilometers. ‘We’re going to play by the rules until we’re told the rules have changed. That’s our approach on the team and the guidance from senior leaders,’ said Col. John Rafferty, the director of the Army’s long-range-precision-fires cross-functional team, in a meeting with reporters at the Association of the U.S. Army's convention, in Washington, D.C., two weeks before news broke that National Security Advisor John Bolton was alerting allies that the Trump administration may withdraw from the treaty. By then, the Army already had been discussing extending the range of its missiles beyond the legal limitations, said Rafferty. ‘We have worked with our industry partners to determine what is the feasibility going farther than 499 kilometers and we believe that it’s entirely possible to go further with the current [PrSM] missile... Our discussions about advanced propulsion leads us to believe that inside the same form factor, with a change in propulsion, we could go significantly farther’... Abrogating the treaty also opens the possibility of building even longer-ranged ‘strategic fires’ such as rocket-boosted artillery shells and ground-launched hypersonic missiles, both of which could hit targets beyond 1,000 miles.” (This Army Missile Might be the Pentagon's First Post-INF Weapon, Defense One, October 26, 2018)

Russia must therefore reckon with an independent US nuclear triad in Europe – air, sea[30] and land-based, hypersonic nuclear weapons, with tactical and strategic artillery with rocket-propelled projectiles – which opens up the possibility for the American military to destroy air and missile defense positions, command centers, infrastructure and, of course, nuclear weapons in the entire European part of the country with virtually no warning time. And the European allies, without having been consulted in detail, are given the task of providing the preferred battlefield for the nuclear confrontation with Russia due to their proximity to the great Eurasian land power.

6. Maneuvers as a permanent fixture

The USA and its allies train on the practical implementation of war planning against Russia in small and large maneuvers throughout the year, in line with the size of the military task of establishing the operational readiness of their overall force from a standing start as far as possible. Firstly, it takes account of the fact that ensuring interoperability and collective control of the battlefield is a new kind of major military task simply because of the expansion of NATO to include the Eastern European states and the Baltic states, bringing the total to 29 countries; in addition, there are neutral countries such as Finland and Sweden that are already virtually integrated into the Alliance and candidates such as Georgia and Ukraine whose armed forces are to be brought up to the level of cooperation required as far as possible, and finally Japan and South Korea in the Far East. Secondly, this battlefield itself has become much more complex; the interaction of national armies and their branches is a question of successful networking, from US satellite reconnaissance to Polish infantrymen. Thirdly, new logistical problems have to be overcome in the prospective theater of war. Because of the strategic gains – the former glacis of the Soviet Union is now part of NATO – and the goal of building a front around the world’s largest territorial state, the ability to deploy troops to NATO’s far advanced eastern borders, to secure supplies across the Atlantic and, with a view to China, also across the Pacific, plays a decisive role. Fourthly, the professional handling of nuclear war requires a particularly high level of practice under real conditions, and fifthly, the more the military leadership comes to grips with the enemy, the more precisely it wants to know what the enemy’s qualities are: precision of reconnaissance, speed of reaction, functionality of the chain of command, operational suitability of soldiers and equipment in extreme situations, so that the increasing number of near or actual collisions in recent years is anything but a miracle. Maneuvers, air and sea patrols close to the enemy’s borders, intrusions into its airspace and territorial waters are valuable tests of its will and ability to stand up to its own forces. Tests that represent a massive invasion threat, especially in the case of large-scale maneuvers, and are intended to bind and strain enemy forces.

*

What is happening here is impressive:

“While NATO soldiers are currently practicing all kinds of combat operations, an important part of ‘Trident Juncture 2018’ is already over: the troop relocation. Huge quantities of material had to be transported to Norway; according to the Bundeswehr, the equipment weighed 68,000 tons and had a total volume of 277,000 cubic meters. This is new for the German armed forces. Even during the Cold War, the Bundeswehr had never carried out anything like this, confirmed Brigadier General Ullrich Spannuth, Commander of the NATO ‘Spearhead’ Land Brigade... Back then, troops and equipment were mainly relocated within national borders. In the new Cold War, however, the alliance’s borders have shifted so far east that the Bundeswehr now has to practice transporting huge quantities of material over long distances. This time, the port of Emden played a central role, with ships from the Danish shipping company DFDS picking up the German military equipment and sailing to Norway. Because the Federal Republic does not have its own strategic sea transport, DFDS concluded a cooperation agreement with the German Armed Forces in 2006, according to which the shipping company must be able to provide a certain level of sea transport capacity at any time within the shortest possible time. ‘Trident Juncture 2018’ from October 25 to November 23 is currently not the only war exercise with significant participation by German soldiers, which began in the middle of last week and will continue until the middle of next week.” (Junge Welt, October 29, 2018)

“Yet, the associated amount of ‘Contribution’ to the increased number of exercise activities is more important than the mere presence of troops and capabilities. The United States participates in numerous large and small-scale exercises and training projects. Saber Strike, a multinational US-led major exercise of this kind, ended a few days ago in Poland. 18,000 troops from 19 different nations were involved in the training of the forward-deployed battlegroups and of other reinforcement forces. This exercise format is no exception. At an even larger scale, among others, the US-led exercise Saber Guardian was held in Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria in 2017 as one of the biggest exercises for land forces. Apart from the United States with 14,000 troops, another 21 nations with altogether 11,000 troops, including forces from Germany, came together with the objective of training how to cross major rivers under combat conditions. The aim of these exercises, mentioned by way of example, is not only to enhance interoperability, a common situation picture and situational understanding as well as coordinated action. They also send a clear signal to the outside world: The United States honor their commitment to support the European partners and the transatlantic willingness for collective defense...For the US Army, this means, for example, that additional materiel and equipment must be kept available for two armored maneuver brigades (consisting of 9,000 troops and equipped with 180 main battle tanks and 180 armored infantry combat vehicles), two artillery brigades and forces committed to air defense, engineer, logistic and transport tasks and in medical care – materiel that is required for independently conducting land-based defensive operations on the eastern flank of NATO. When it comes to the air forces, the development of air bases is pushed forward, as are the contributions to intensified air policing to protect the NATO airspace. With respect to the maritime dimension of defense, the objective is to strengthen anti-submarine and counter-mine capabilities, in particular.” (Reliability beyond Trump tweets. The US military contribution in Europe. Philipp Lange, Federal Academy for Security Policy. Working Paper on Security Policy, No. 18/2018, p. 3-4)

“‘Trident Juncture 2018’ brought another important innovation: the participation of the US aircraft carrier ‘Harry S. Truman’, which on October 19 was the first US aircraft carrier to enter Arctic waters since September 1991. The ship’s presence off the coast of Norway must be seen as a clear signal, especially to Russia. However, another aspect could prove to be even more consequential: the ‘Harry S. Truman’s’ approach was via the ‘GIUK Gap’, the sea route on an imaginary line between Greenland (‘G’), Iceland (‘I’) and the United Kingdom (‘UK’). This is not only the route that a US warship must take if it wants to reach Arctic waters in the north of Europe; it is also the sea route that Russian submarines can use to reach the Atlantic to disrupt US supplies to Europe – or not... The aircraft carrier was not just sent as a show of force; rather, US military strategists are using the ‘GIUK gap’ to look at a sea area ‘in which we may have to fight,’ explained Goure. Military training will therefore be carried out there more frequently in the future. Goure also pointed out an aspect in the Navy Times that is often overlooked when looking at ‘Trident Juncture 2018’. The sea areas in which there will probably be more maneuvers in the future because training will have to be carried out in potential areas of operation include the Mediterranean and the Western Pacific, according to the US military expert. The Mediterranean is important with regard to the Middle East, but also with regard to the Russian Mediterranean fleet, and the Western Pacific with regard to China.” (Junge Welt, October 29, 2018)

“2017 was a very busy year for US strategic bombers; they engaged in a variety of forward deployments and long-range strike exercises to Northern Europe, the Western Pacific, and Australia. B-2 bombers conducted long-range strike sorties into the Mediterranean and Pacific in January, followed by a long-range B-52 strike exercise toward the Mediterranean in May. Nonnuclear B-1 bombers, recently equipped with the JASSM-ER conventional long-range cruise missile, conducted 15 integrated missions with nuclear B-52s near Australia and the South China Sea in January and February. This was followed by high-profile overflights of South Korea in March and August in response to North Korean missile test flights over Japan. In June 2017 – as part of the BALTOPS and Saber Strike exercises – all three types of heavy bombers deployed to the United Kingdom for regional deterrence operations over the Baltic Sea and Eastern Europe – the first time that all three heavy bomber types have been deployed to Europe at the same time. Some B-52s were intercepted by Russian fighters. The operations also included dual-capable F-16 fighter-bombers. Finally, Strategic Command’s Global Thunder exercise in October and November practiced command and control of offensive nuclear strike operations, as well as Strategic Command’s other mission areas across the United States. Around the same time, B-52s deployed to Europe and B-2 bombers apparently simulated strikes against North Korea.” (Hans M. Kristensen / Robert S. Norris, United States nuclear forces, 2018, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 74:2, pp. 120-131, 124)

“After two Russian fighter jets flew within 30 feet of the USS Donald Cook last Tuesday, Secretary of State John Kerry warned that the Russian action could have resulted in the jets being shot down. Kerry told CNN en Español that ‘under the rules of engagement, that could have been a shoot-down, so people need to understand that this is serious business.’ When asked why the Russian plane was not shot down, a senior military official told CNN that ‘the Russians were dangerous but did not demonstrate hostile intent and were unarmed.’ On Saturday, U.S. European Command, which oversees U.S. military operations in Europe, said that a Russian interceptor flew within 50 feet of an American reconnaissance aircraft, a maneuver the U.S. military described as ‘unsafe and unprofessional.’... Conley noted that there had been a marked increase in these type of incidents. In January a Russian jet fighter came within 20 feet of a U.S. RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft flying over the Black Sea. In October, U.S. Navy jets intercepted two Russian Tu-142 aircraft that were flying near the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan in the Pacific Ocean. In an incident in June, a Russian Su-24 jet flew within 500 meters – 1,640 feet – of a U.S. guided-missile destroyer that was sailing in the Black Sea near Crimea.” (Russian jets keep buzzing U.S. ships and planes. What can the U.S. do? CNN, April 19, 2016)

“The Ukrainian Navy has conducted exercises in the Kherson province near the Crimean border, the military’s Facebook account said on Wednesday. According to the statement, the command of the Ukrainian naval forces held a maneuver in coordination with artillery units in Kherson near the administrative border with Crimea. The purpose of the exercises is ‘to defend the sea coast and fight the enemy who has launched an offensive from the occupied territories.’ The Ukrainian army also conducted training ‘in the areas where the enemy has a strong presence.’ The focus was on artillery exercises in conditions of limited visibility and at night.” (sputniknews, June 27, 2018)

““Now Ukraine wants to call NATO maneuvers in the Sea of Azov,’ said Lavrov... ‘But it is no longer possible to go there, since our treaty with Ukraine already requires a commitment from both sides for military ships to cross the Sea of Azov,’ said the minister. Despite this fact, Kyiv is striving for these maneuvers and is being ‘favored’ in doing so. Lavrov described NATO activities on the Russian borders as ‘provocative.’ Specifically, it is about the accumulation of weapons and the increase of the NATO contingent on the Russian borders, as well as the alliance's exercises in Ukraine, Georgia and the Black Sea.” (sputniknews, October 18, 2018)

The large number of maneuver locations, along Russia's western border across the Black Sea to the far north, as well as the often simultaneous holding of maneuvers, creates its own quality of threat.

III. The economic disempowerment of Russia through defunct arms and economic warfare

With the comprehensive threat scenario that the United States is building up to secure its unrestricted world domination, it is not only putting Russia in an extremely precarious military position; it is also imposing an arms race on its rival that is expressly calculated to drive it to ruin:

“More than any other nation, America can expand the field of competition by seizing the initiative to challenge our competitors where we have advantages and they lack strength. A more lethal force [what can’t you improve!], strong alliances and partnerships, American technological innovations, and a culture of performance will generate decisive and sustainable U.S. military advantages... Rivals’ willingness to abandon aggression will depend on their perceptions of U.S. strength and the vitality of our alliances and partnerships.” (NDS, p. 4-5) “Where possible, we must improve existing systems to maximize the return on past investments. In other areas, we should seek new capabilities that create clear advantages for our military while posing costly dilemmas for our adversaries.” (NSS, p. 29)

Where possible, we must improve existing systems to maximize returns on prior investments. In other areas we should seek new capabilities that create clear advantages for our military while posing costly dilemmas for our adversaries.

Or, short and snappy:

“Let it be an arms race. We will outmatch them at every pass and outlast them all.” (D. Trump)

Russia can look forward to a “competition” in which America will not only bring its “more lethal forces” and its network of allies into the field as instruments of war, but will bring all its economic power to bear, enabling it to “extend” this competition as far as is necessary to “force rivals to abandon aggression.” For the 45th President of the United State, there is no question that nothing can come of this but “clear advantages for our military” and “costly dilemmas for our adversaries.” He commands, first, a great nation that reliably provides America with the highest level of “technological innovation” and a “culture of achievement,” second, the center of the world economy with a military-industrial complex that far outshines any other armory in the world, and a national credit with which he finances that complex to such an extent that the US military has all the “new capabilities” it demands and until the competition is economically ruined.

To make sure the Russians understand that not fighting back would be the only sensible solution for them and the best thing for everyone involved, he explains it to them again in a child-friendly way:

“We have more money than anybody else by far. We’ll build it up until they come to their senses. When they do, then we’ll all be smart, and we’ll all stop. And by the way not only stop, we’ll reduce, which I would love to do. But right now, they (Russia) have not adhered to the agreement.”(D. Trump, CNN, October 24, 2018)

The USA only sees unsustainable costs in the arms race for the other side; the USA itself uses the monetary power of its dollar ruthlessly – as if it were infinite by definition. In 2019, it decided on the largest military budget of all time and will invest around 1.7 trillion US dollars over the next 30 years for the aforementioned renewal of its nuclear weapons alone – or however much it costs. For Trump, linking national security to money issues at all seems like a refusal to do what is necessary; he is announcing an open-ended arms budget in line with the purpose of the arms race:

“We recognize that weakness is the surest path to conflict, and unrivaled power is the most certain means of defense. For this reason, our strategy breaks from the damaging defense sequester. We’re going to get rid of that.” (Trump’s speech introducing the National Security Strategy)

Where all the money for the restoration of America’s uncontested superiority comes from is clearly not a headache for the US government. It simply assumes that its dollar is the epitome of global wealth and that its unconditional recognition and validity by the rest of the world does not suffer in any way if it uses it in any quantity to secure its military supremacy over the rest of the world. Who should deny credit to a nation on its way to absolute “unrivaled power,” and by what means? [31]

To support the hopeful expectation that Russia will ruin itself economically if it wants to keep up with the announced deadly arms race, the United States is also directly attacking its sources of revenue and doing what it can to exclude the Kremlin from world business.[32] In doing so, it is taking advantage of the success of Gorbachev’s reconciliation policy: the days of the Soviet Union and its Comecon being largely self-sufficient are long gone; since its conversion to the better system, Russia has been integrated into world capitalism, completely dependent on the world market, so that America also has the economic vulnerability of the USSR’s legal successor at its disposal as a weapon.

The American thought leaders justify their comprehensive offensive in the usual spirit of justification in matters of war and project their subsumption of all civilian instruments and forms of commerce under the definition of the enemy onto the conduct of their strategic rivals: they want it to be recognized that Russia and others are abusing the peaceful trade and commerce to which they have been admitted for their not at all peaceful purposes:

“Both revisionist powers and rogue regimes are competing across all dimensions of power. They have increased efforts short of armed conflict by expanding coercion to new fronts, violating principles of sovereignty, exploiting ambiguity, and deliberately blurring the lines between civil and military goals.” (NDS, p. 2)

“As warlike behavior migrates into new competitive spaces – strategic influence, commerce, culture, domestic politics, cyberspace, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum — the U.S. government and private sector must recognize the far-reaching and growing hazards of hyper-competition and rival gray-zone strategies. The boundaries between war and peace, battlefield and market, and adversary and competitor are dissolving.” (The Weaponization of Everything, N. Freier / J. Dagle, Defense One, September 9, 2018)

And America has also aided and abetted these goings-on by standing by for far too long:

“China, Russia, and other state and non-state actors recognize that the United States often views the world in binary terms, with states being either ‘at peace’ or ‘at war,’ when it is actually an arena of continuous competition.” (NSS, p. 28)

From which, of course, only one thing can necessarily follow: America must then resolutely confront this, declare war on its rivals on this battlefield as well, and do everything in its power to cut them off.

*

Even if the local public doesn't see it that way – if you look, you can’t really miss it: The American world power is aiming to disempower Russia.

IV. America is working to make the ideal of deterrence a practical reality

In its military doctrines, the USA professes the “strategy of deterrence” as the reason it follows in its efforts to wrestle down its Russian rival, which it is pursuing at enormous expense and at all possible levels – in terms of arms, geostrategy, world politics and global economic warfare. What deterrence means in the case of Russia – and also China – is explained by one of the key figures in American military planning, the co-author of the current security doctrine, as follows:

“The United States consequently needs a new war fighting approach adapted to this threat [from the revisionist powers, ed.] This new war fighting approach involves U.S. forces resisting Chinese or Russian attacks from the very beginning of hostilities, fighting in and through enduringly contested operational environments to first blunt Beijing or Moscow’s assault and then defeat it – without ever gaining the kind of all-domain dominance that the United States could establish against Iraq or Serbia. With its invasion blunted or readily reversed, neither China nor Russia would have a way to end the war favorably; rather, Beijing or Moscow would face the awful choice of expanding the war in ways that play to U.S. advantages or swallowing the bitter but tolerable pill of settling on terms the United States can accept.” (Testimony Before The Senate Armed Services Committee. Hearing on Implementation of the National Defense Strategy, E.A. Colby, January 29, 2019, p. 6)

This US strategist formulates the ideal of deterrence, the real goal that the USA is practically striving for with its efforts to achieve uncontested superiority – and, by the way, he relegates the idea that the strategy of deterrence pursued by the USA is aimed at preventing war to the realm of ideology with his statements in this regard. The real goal of this strategy, which is pursued with the utmost emphasis, is to achieve a position of power in which the world power can credibly announce to its strategic competitors that – wherever in the world, against whomever and in whatever crisis situation they find themselves challenged to make the transition to the use of military force – they can and will be faced with a disastrous alternative: Either they are dragged into a grueling war with the American armed forces, which are superior under all circumstances, and are ultimately defeated, or they capitulate beforehand and submit to the conditions that America then dictates to them.

This strategic objective determines the standards of warfare that the USA sets for its armed forces: they must be able to respond to any military action by their strategic competitors, which the USA defines as an “attack,” in accordance with this statement. The USA takes into account the fact that even with all the armed forces at its disposal, it cannot defeat states of this caliber like it did Saddam’s Iraq or Milošević’s Serbia with overwhelming superiority or virtually in passing – after all, we are talking about major powers armed with nuclear weapons and otherwise equipped with enormous military potential. For the military conflicts with Russia and China, for which the US wants to be prepared and for which it is preparing, a strategic reorientation of the American armed forces is therefore considered necessary, the “war fighting approach” cited above: first and foremost, it stipulates that the US will not leave the field to its rivals anywhere. Wherever Russia or China deploy their troops, the United States should enter the conflict with the requirement that its military must first hold its ground against the armed forces of the opponent it then encounters; under all circumstances, at whatever level the opponent confronts them, even on fiercely contested terrain. Under all circumstances, the US armed forces must prevent the enemy from asserting itself on the ground and creating a favorable military situation for it; it must “blunt” its attack, i.e. render it ineffective, thus forcing it into a situation in which it must either accept the failure of its operation or mobilize additional forces and escalate the conflict. And the American armed forces must be able to react to the latter – at any time and at any level of escalation – in such a way that the opponent’s escalation only puts them in an even more hopeless situation. It must be able to bring everything necessary to the respective theater of war “within 72 hours” in order to present the opponent with the “terrible choice” of “expanding the war in a way that is to the advantage of the USA.”[33] This interesting dialectic, according to which an escalation by the enemy must work to the “advantage” of the USA, assumes, of course, that the American armed forces can confront the enemy with absolute escalation dominance. Only then can it present them with this terrible choice, i.e. deny them any prospect of deciding the war in their favor or even averting the threat of defeat.

In this approach to warfare, the ultimate weapon, the nuclear arms of the USA, doesn’t just do its job when it is used:

“The nuclear deterrent underwrites every U.S. military operation on the globe—it is the backstop and foundation of our national defense and the defense of our allies.” (Nuclear Modernization: Ensuring a Safe, Secure, Reliable, and Credible U.S. Nuclear Deterrent, media.defense.gov, April 1, 2019)

With its absolute destructive power at the highest level of warfare, it lends penetrating power to the use of every military means of the USA, right down to drone warfare: it confronts every opponent at every stage of warfare – and by no means only after going through all the escalation stages – with the question of whether it wants to risk its total destruction from an American nuclear strike by continuing to resist.

This is the mission that the American armed forces must be up to, and they are being armed and deployed accordingly. And for the highest level of escalation, this means that the use of its own nuclear weapons potential must be available as a political option. The American world power is working on fulfilling this imperative because if this option is available to it without restriction, it will finally have achieved the position of power vis-à-vis the rest of the world of states that it is striving for with its strategy of deterrence. The military planner quoted above is positively giddy at this prospect:

“The risks of playing nuclear games with fire may be enormous, but the rewards of gaining nuclear superiority over an adversary are equally enormous. After all, nuclear weapons are the ultimate trump card: if you can convince your enemy that you have found a way to play that trump card and are truly prepared to go through with it, there is nothing more powerful.” (If You Want Peace, Prepare for Nuclear War, E.A. Colby, Foreign Affairs, Nov./Dec. 2018, p. 25-32)

The man explains that in the field of imperialist competition, it is not the possession of nuclear weapons that is the ultimate means of gaining respect in the world of states, but the ability to use them with impunity. And this stands and falls with the ability to convincingly demonstrate to any rivals who also possess nuclear weapons that their nuclear weapons do not give them the corresponding potential for deterrence. The “way” to “play this trump card” is to deprive the opponent of its deterrent potential, to render its nuclear weapons harmless, in short: to disarm it. And, as we have seen, the USA is working on this to the best of its ability – by making itself and the holy of holies of its world domination, its destructive potential stored in the silos of its intercontinental missiles and elsewhere ready for use, unassailable; by approaching the ideal in its armaments program of being able to intercept Russian missiles in the launch phase if possible or to disable them before they are launched; by building up the appropriate equipment on Russia’s borders, depriving the enemy of the opportunity to react, and so on. What America is striving for in this way is the ability to wage nuclear war – “there is nothing more powerful.”

On the way there, the US strategists – and of course the American politicians, from whom the former have their mandate – do not assume that this is a program whose implementation Russia will simply accept to the bitter end and which could somehow still be reconciled with it. After all, it is directed against its most vital interests. America’s strategists and politicians know what they are doing. So they also know that they are pursuing a program that presupposes a willingness to “go through” with “it” – even against the declared and armed will of this strategic rival – i.e. to risk a nuclear war with Russia and then, if it ‘comes to it’, to wage it.

Of course, they are also doing everything they can to ensure that they are spared this. They are pursuing the disempowerment of Russia not only in the field of strategic warfare, but in all fields in which this state operates, accumulates the means of its power and struggles for its power status in the world. Russia should realize that it has no chance, that resistance is of no use to it. It should give up and go under; if possible – according to the vision of a former American Secretary of Defense – “not with a big bang, but with a whimper.”

*

America’s strategists and politicians owe the implementation of this program to none other than their nation and its world domination, i.e. American imperialism. The latter claims unlimited power to control the international balance of power. It demands the subordination of all other state powers to America’s sovereign right to world domination. To achieve this, the USA actually needs something like a global monopoly on the use of force that stands above the state monopolists of force, and Russia stands in the way of perfecting this – uncontested superiority, as it is called in America.

V. USSR and Russia: continuity and progress in fighting a power that has too many weapons

The effort to wrestle down the most important strategic opponent has been on the agenda of every American leader from the founding of the USSR to its demise and Russia’s renaissance under Putin.

As early as the 1950s, US strategists were concerned that the rise of the Soviet Union as a nuclear power meant that they had lost the freedom to wage war against their most powerful enemy:

“With each side possessing the capability of inflicting catastrophic blows on the other, war is said to be no longer a rational course of action.” (Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 1957, p. 72)

This dilemma by no means led them to resign, but rather to resolutely calculate with all possibilities to save nuclear war as a “reasonable course of action” and make it viable, even in the face of the “nuclear stalemate.” Thus, there is a nuclear arms race in which the USA is trying to evade the “balance of terror.” Based on the logic of the “last resort,” the risk of its use is kept as low as possible. Very humane statements such as:

“War is no longer a conceivable tool of policy”

are meant in this way:

“This is not to say that we can afford not to be without a capability for fighting an all-out war.Obviously, if we do not retain a well-protected capability for massive retaliation, the calculus of risks ...with respect to all-out war would shift... The control over the conditions which will determine whether there is going to be an all-out war will depend to a large extent on us. Whether we keep up in the technological race, whether our retaliatory force is well dispersed, whether our air defense exacts the maximum attrition and our civil defense is capable of preventing panics [!] ...Thus the stalemate for all-out war is inherently precarious. It will impel a continuous race between offense and defense, and it will require a tremendous effort on our part simply to stay even.” (Kissinger, op. cit., p. 109)

The ideology about the necessity of maintaining “stability” in a system of stable deterrence no longer needs to be taken seriously. This complete madness is only about one thing: enforcing the rationality of war as a means of policy, even and especially when it comes to total war as a particular war aim. It is precisely the military spirit which, by hook or by crook, stands by the dogma that only the criterion of success may count for the use of the means of destruction. The calculation that there will be 20 million deaths on one’s side, if the enemy loses twice as much, is the realistic calculation of the Third World War.

For this calculation to work out, the superiority of the American ‘retaliatory forces’ over the corresponding potential of the Russians must be established at all costs. The nuclear arms race must restore the calculability of the “last resort.” The calculation is free again when the risk for the enemy is always greater than the advantage he can calculate. [34]

How meticulously, down to the last warhead, the Pentagon was planning at the time of the strategy of massive retaliation in the 50s, as well as the subsequent strategy of flexible response in the 60s and 70s, in order to achieve the destruction of the enemy necessary and expedient for the defense of US world domination, is explained, contrary to his actual intention, by a military specialist from the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Institute for International and Security Affairs), who, in order to reject the US nuclear war planning, comes up with the accusation that it followed an “inflexible” destruction strategy:

“With its previous strategy of ‘massive retaliation’, as formulated in the 1950s, the USA was in fact envisaging the large-scale destruction of industrial and military targets as well as population centers in the Soviet Union (and in China). The first Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP), approved by President Eisenhower in December 1960, contained 3,729 targets in the Soviet Union, China, North Korea and Eastern Europe that were to be attacked with 3,423 nuclear weapons. Around one fifth of the targets were civilian, four fifths military. The estimates at the time only took into account the effects of the explosion itself (‘blast effects’), since the effects of fire and radiation were difficult to measure. According to this, around 54 percent of the Soviet and 16 percent of the Chinese population would have fallen victim to these attacks within three days, i.e. around 220 million people. Although the declaratory strategy was changed towards graduated options and flexible response, the operational strategic nuclear target planning, as reflected in the Single Integrated Operation Plan, remained anything but flexible well into the 1970s.” (Aporien atomarer Abschreckung. Zur US-Nukleardoktrin und ihren Problemen [Aporias of nuclear deterrence. On the US nuclear doctrine and its problems], Peter Rudolf, SWP Studie 15, July 2018, p. 12)

Since the USA has seen its ability to wage war restricted by the “nuclear stalemate,” its military planners have been working on overcoming this barrier – so successfully that the days of strategies of “massive retaliation” and “flexible response” are now almost forgotten.

This progress can also be seen in the special foreign policy discipline of arms diplomacy, which is itself a product of the nuclear stalemate. Precisely because the USA, the leading nuclear war power, is doing everything it can to make war manageable according to the rules of military art, even with the “last” weapons, it is very keen to reassure its opponent that it understands the threat of war with which it is confronted “correctly” as long as the breakthrough is a long time coming: not as preparation for an immediate attack, but already as a threat to be taken so seriously that it in no way expects to survive a “nuclear exchange of blows” with fewer risks than it has to expect for itself. Thus, in the phase of so-called “détente,” a strange kind of understanding was reached between the adversaries about their mutual threat of annihilation, or about the impossibility of freely handling nuclear potential: pursued by one party in the never-disappointed calculation of gaining strategic advantages in the arms trade, by the other in the always frustrated hope of coming closer to a somehow more peaceful coexistence through a proven willingness to negotiate in the field of war equipment and corresponding advance payments. An understanding to which humanity owes, firstly, the military-diplomatic achievement of arms control: the mutually agreed definition of upper limits for the arms race: SALT. [35] Secondly, in the same treaty, as an enormous “confidence-building measure,” the opponents also assured each other that they would not relativize the other’s threat of annihilation by building up their own defensive missiles against their offensive weapons (Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, ABM). In this way, the USA successfully integrated its enemy into its plan to make the strategic risks of nuclear war calculable for itself, ideally controllable, and the USSR took the de facto recognition that it was “unassailable” for the USA as a step towards abandoning the option of “nuclear war” and towards a peaceful “coexistence of systems.”

Under Ronald Reagan, the USA could no longer afford this kind of treaty-guaranteed restriction on its world domination; with absolute ruthlessness against the costs and uncompromising readiness for war against the evil empire, Reagan did his utmost to preserve his nation’s exceptional position, as the American raison d'état demands, both in the past and today. Under his presidency, the USA set out to force the Soviet Union to abdicate: It added a final offensive to the decades-long bitter fight against communism via an embargo policy, the Cocom list, human rights weapons, proxy wars and the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact: defunct arms with all its consequences. Reagan and Weinberger wanted the decision and did their best with their large-scale “Strategic Defense Initiative” (SDI) to secure America’s dominion over near-Earth space as a battlefield and deployment site for weapons to eliminate enemy nuclear missiles – in other words, to finally provide the nation with the means to successfully wage the great war against the nuclear power in the East.

The fact that it didn’t come to a bang after all was due to a self-criticism on the part of the Soviet leadership that rarely occurs in the world of states. From the point of view of “modern thinking,” which he decided to adopt, the acting head of the USSR thought that a “system contradiction” between his camp and that of freedom and democracy was completely superfluous; in order to “modernize” his country, he envisaged applying the “principles of success,” whose expert handling he attributed to the very impressive potency of the states of the West – which, in his view, would have put an end to all the hostilities of imperialism. Thanks to his illusions, there was another revolutionary turning point, namely in the field of arms diplomacy: the last head of the Eastern superpower offered genuine disarmament in contrast to the earlier ‘limitation’ of missile armaments to ceilings that had never been reached: the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) to reduce strategic nuclear weapons and the INF agreement to abolish land-based medium-range missiles in Europe. [36]

Of course: the fact that it was not only the deviant communist system that earned the USSR determined American hostility, but also the fact that, as a real socialist world power, it decisively relativized the USA’s quasi-monopoly on the use of force, was directly felt by the “modernized” legal successor to the USSR: it could not get rid of the hostility of US imperialism. After the peaceful capitulation of the Soviet Union, the unilateral abandonment of the irreconcilable enmity of the systems, including conversion to capitalism with ruinous consequences for the former evil empire, there was hope in America for a while that the remnants of the Red Army would be transformed into a militarily insignificant force through lack of money, brain drain, vodka and rust. The new Russia was therefore released from the role of main enemy for a while. Of course, this did not mean that the USA subsequently slackened in its efforts to achieve uncontested superiority.

Bush Jr. found out that there was no longer any need for a written agreement on missiles, that Russia no longer deserved the respect of a serious adversary, and that America could devote itself to its strategic programs. He terminated the ABM agreement and began to deploy a powerful missile defense shield. Conversely, Russia was not to be released from diplomatic arms supervision; no stone was to be left unturned to exploit the new Russia’s reason of state based on friendship and cooperation for as long and as far as possible. Russia’s disarmament was greatly assisted by the genuine scrapping of weapons: controlled destruction of chemical weapons, already done in Russia, but still not done in America,[37] control of Russian plutonium stocks, negotiations down to conventional armaments under the CFE Treaty,[38] in which NATO used its advance towards the Russian border as a means of demanding restrictions on the deployment of the Russian military within Russia’s borders as proof of Russia’s willingness to cooperate and loyalty to the treaty, which, after Russia’s abandonment of the game, at least earned it the accusation that the other side was in breach of the treaty.

In the Obama administration’s 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, the Russian Federation’s nuclear arsenal no longer figures as the ultimate challenge to US national security:

“Today, only Russia and China have the capability to conduct a large-scale ballistic missile attack on the territory of the United States, but this is very unlikely and not the focus of U.S. BMD.” (Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 4)

It is true that the Russian nuclear power was still, or was once again, considered to have outstanding penetrating power. But at the time, there was hope of being able to engage Russia as a partner in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for the disarmament of third parties and, in return for its recognition as a competent world power in matters of world order, to negotiate the piecemeal surrender of its nuclear potency. This is why, in contrast to Bush, arms diplomacy was revived at the highest level under Obama – this time it was about an even more extensive ‘reduction’ in the intercontinental missile department after START: New START. [39]

However, the friendly offer of continued self-disarmament flanked by great comradeship was rejected. The new Russian leadership knew what to make of the American assertion that its ever-expanding defense systems are exclusively geared towards threats from the Middle East or future as yet unknown dangers; it took account of the need to secure its nuclear power by concentrating its armaments on the development of nuclear weapons that can penetrate the American defense shield with deadly certainty. Towards the end of his term of office, the Nobel Peace Prize winner in the White House realized that a $1.2 trillion program to modernize the US nuclear force was needed to ensure America’s undisputed superiority.

Trump, the current President of the United States, regularly terrifies both the American political class and the NATO allies: he talks about Putin like a good buddy with whom he could make all kinds of useful deals, from leader to leader so to speak – if only they would let him. [40] This is precisely what has turned political America, quite united, against him. Trump can be macho, racist, a climate denier, a cynic and a liar without it doing him any significant harm. But what could really cost this man his office would be successful proof that he has somehow cooperated with the superpower to the east. His opponents are mainly concentrating on pursuing the “collusion” accusation against Trump and Congress, with ever more far-reaching sanctions resolutions against Russia, is trying to limit presidential powers in order to keep Trump in line with this. Opposition to Russia is therefore – across party lines and beyond all other political differences – an unbreakable part of the American reason of state.

However, the president’s attitude toward Russia, which has been thoroughly misunderstood as naivety, reveals a lot about the state of the conflict, namely about the progress America has made in dealing with its great strategic rival. The arms agreements concluded under Obama are seen in Washington as an absolutely unnecessary self-imposed constraint, as “bad deals, very bad” in the words of the head of government. In its approach to Russia as a power, the USA is, as it were, anticipating the result of the ‘persuasion’ it wants to achieve with its arms program. As if it had already convinced this power of its complete impotence, it takes the liberty of declaring the inherited treaties in the field of arms control obsolete; in clear contrast to the earlier years of negotiations on the mutual weapons arsenal, the INF Treaty is terminated and Russia is given a deadline of just six months to dispose of the disputed missiles. The upcoming extension of the START treaty is also being called into question. [41] On the one hand, Trump is replacing the former enforced respect for the opponent with a diplomacy of ultimatums; the law of the jungle appears here as a friendly offer to the other side to spare itself a major confrontation by voluntarily disarming itself and entering the new situation peacefully. On the other hand, the commander-in-chief of the world’s most impressive military power is daring to engage in a new type of arms diplomacy in which he also wants to negotiate away China’s medium-range missiles in one go, so to speak – without any corresponding negotiations with China having been initiated or being in prospect. Trump, after the meeting with Putin in Osaka:

“‘The presidents agreed that the two countries want to continue their discussions on a model for gun control for the 21st century,’ it continues. Trump has emphasized his demand that China must also be involved.” (faz.net, June 28, 2019)

Which, incidentally, clearly illustrates the quality of Trump’s alleged friendship with Russia: The President simply assumes – as he has in other cases – that the other side, in view of his “America” which is also unbeatably “first” in its arsenal of weapons, has no choice but to resign itself to a subordinate status in the American world order, to negotiate useful deals with its supreme representative, and to bring China in tow together in the process. [42] In addition to this position of condescending agreement with the opponent, the current President is not lacking in clear statements. After all, he is simultaneously following in the tradition of his great role model Ronald Reagan by calling for a new arms race – and attests in advance to the absolute hopelessness of all efforts by the Russian opposing power, which he is inviting to join in, to even begin to keep up. [43] The man acts as if he alone would teach fear to the Russians and the rest of the world with his Space Force and his very thickest nuclear button – in his posturing he is the perfect character mask of the balance of power that has been achieved: a few decades of research and development with gigantic dollar expenditures in the largest military-industrial complex on the globe and enormous progress in encircling and economically damaging the rival have ensured that the 45th President now has the means standing by to disempower Russia, which not only gives America a certain superiority, but also brings it much closer to the freedom to use the ultimate weapon.

The cynicism of the superior power that he commands is embodied in the figure of today’s President. He not only informs his opponent that the means he has acquired for self-assertion or intends to acquire in the near future are already worth nothing and are guaranteed to be devalued in the near future: It also makes him the offer to let these facts have a good effect on him, to show reason and, in his own interest, not to even get involved in the practical comparison of weapons in which he has no chance. Where the USA no longer has any respect for Russia’s security and other interests and only respects the means of force of this power in the one negative respect that it is making a huge effort to neutralize it, the boss presents the opponent with the prospect of an “arms race” so that he “comes to his senses” and decides on his own to surrender unconditionally, which he would otherwise be forced to do.

*

No wonder that the determination with which the Trump administration is going about breaking the will of its most militarily powerful rival has caused concern, albeit so far mainly in expert circles:

“If the United States were to leave the INF Treaty, another cornerstone of the European security order and the global nuclear order would collapse. Unpredictability and destabilization would increase. Europe must resolutely counter the danger of a new nuclear arms race.” (Der INF-Vertrag vor dem Aus. Ein neuer nuklearer Rüstungswettlauf könnte dennoch verhindert werden [The INF Treaty on the verge of collapse. A new nuclear arms race could still be prevented], SWP-Aktuell 63, November 2018, p. 1)

“In order to stop a land attack, American nuclear weapons would have to be deployed on the battlefield, i.e. the territory of allies or third countries that the enemy uses as a deployment glacis. The authors of NPR 18 evidently consider such deployment options to be realistic, both for sub-strategic nuclear weapons and for systems of the strategic triad. In any case, NPR 18 speaks of warheads with high accuracy and low explosive power for SLBMs, SLCMs and bombs. The preparation of supposedly controllable sub-strategic nuclear strikes carries the risk that a limited nuclear war could appear ‘feasible’. In a crisis, this could lead to irreversible wrong decisions. It would then be only a rhetorical question how many ‘sub-strategic’ nuclear strikes a ‘frontline state’ can survive.” (SWP-Aktuell 15, March 2018, p. 8)

The concerns of these strategic experts are directed at the peace, which is increasingly in danger – completely unimpressed by the fact that the USA only wants to maintain this peace if it can impose its will on the rest of the world as required with military destructive power that is superior by several dimensions.

There are warnings of a loss of the nuclear balance that has secured a “global nuclear order” in which it has been easy to live – regardless of the fact that the USA has been working energetically for decades – in the midst of peace, of course, when else? – to eliminate this highly civilized achievement; and in an almost absurd abstraction from the fact that the aforementioned glorious ‘balance’ consisted of nothing other than the ability of two states to equally wipe out humanity several times over.

Instead of order and balance, it is lamented, “the danger of a new nuclear arms race” now looms – as if this were a mere possibility of rearmament, which is to be feared particularly because of its self-perpetuating nature, because of an automatism completely without any purpose – and not the ready-made program of the USA to drive its rival to ruin by means of an arms race.

The “preparation of sub-strategic nuclear weapons strikes” by the major transatlantic partner is less about the preparation of sub-strategic nuclear weapons strikes than the mistaken belief of American strategists in their “supposed controllability,” a delusion which in turn could feed the illusion that a nuclear war can really be waged, so that the disaster can hardly be stopped: the downfall of a frontline state due to “irreversible wrong decisions.”

What is remarkable about all these complaints is that they disapprove of the unprecedented increase in the USA’s nuclear and conventional means of war without saying a single word about the purpose of the matter. Critical experts prefer to pay homage to the trusting idea that the American leadership is triggering ‘processes’ with its misguided military policy, which has been abandoned by all good and responsible spirits, and is taking ‘risks’ that no one can want, so that Europe and the world, horribile dictu, may perish without any sense or purpose – rather than being taught by Trump and his ilk that world peace without unrestricted American world domination is simply not available. But with it, of course, it is. If the enemy realizes that it has no chance and voluntarily surrenders, the USA will gladly renounce the use of force, a connection that the American nuclear warriors with literary gifts like to express in this way:

“The surest way to prevent war is to be prepared to win one.” (NDS, p. 5)

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[1] National Security Strategy (December 18, 2017), NSS in the following; National Defense Strategy (January 19, 2018), NDS; Nuclear Posture Review (February 2, 2018), NPR; Missile Defense Review (January 17, 2019), MDR.

[2] The article “Trump gets down to business — and so does Xi)” in GegenStandpunkt 2-18 is about the confrontation between the USA and China. This essay deals exclusively with the strategic positioning of the USA vis-à-vis the Russian Federation. It goes without saying that China should be taken into account in everything the USA plans to do to Russia.

[3] This formula, popular in the Western military world, for the unacceptable Russian crime of denying the USA access to any “area” and wanting to assert itself in it, contains the world power’s claim to unrestricted imperialist freedom of action, asserted as a matter of course: its exclusive right to occupy any spot on earth as required in any regional crisis and any conflict and to bring it permanently and completely under its control.

[4] Of course, the American military does not carry out “offensive operations” against enemy missiles as an agggressor, but only if the enemy forces it to do so – “if deterrence fails.” In this sense, the pre-emptive destruction of the enemy’s “offensive missiles” is to be understood as the world power’s ultima ratio of a just self-defense.

[5] The recent technological breakthrough – after nearly 30 years of intensive research – in shooting down an intercontinental ballistic missile with a salvo of defensive missiles gives rise to the fondest hopes for a significant increase in the hit rate: “The U.S. Missile Defense Agency, in cooperation with the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, U.S. Northern Command, and elements of the U.S. Air Force Space Command’s 30th, 50th, and 460th Space Wings, conducted a successful test today against an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) class target. This test was the first salvo engagement of a threat-representative ICBM target by two Ground Based Interceptors (GBI), which were designated GBI-Lead, and GBI-Trail for the test.  The GBI-Lead destroyed the reentry vehicle, as it was designed to do. The GBI-Trail then looked at the resulting debris and remaining objects, and, not finding any other reentry vehicles, selected the next ‘most lethal object’ it could identify, and struck that, precisely as it was designed to do.” (The Warzone, March 25, 2019) It goes without saying that (even) this progress does not come for free:

“On March 22, 2019, the Pentagon announced it was adding more than $4.1 billion to the Boeing-led team’s 2018 GMD contract.” (Ibid.)

[6] Twenty-two Aegis cruisers are currently in service (navy.mil, as of January 9, 2017) as well as 66 Aegis destroyers. Ten more destroyers are currently under construction and twelve are on order (navy.mil, as of January 23, 2019). Each of the ships can be equipped with up to 128 cruise missiles or interceptor missiles. (See: Russia may have violated the INF Treaty. Here’s how the United States appears to have done the same. Theodore A. Postol, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 14, 2019)

[7]“Shanahan said the Space Force would be between 15,000 and 20,000 people. That’s already an increase from last month, when defense officials sent a Space Force legislative proposal to lawmakers that talked about an estimated 15,000 civilian and military personnel.” (Defense One, March 20, 2019)

[8] “Unlike land-based sensors, space sensors do not require basing rights or agreements with foreign states.” (MDR, p. 36)

[9] “‘[They are] two very different concepts but when you’re talking hypersonic [weapons], it is good to have what I consider intended redundancy because it’s a hard technology, making materials and propulsion systems that last in 3,000° Fahrenheit temperatures is not easy’” (DARPA preparing to test fly two hypersonic weapons, janes.com, May 3, 2019)

[10] Persistent research since the Reagan era and – once again – a huge amount of money are slowly paying off: “It’s not the first time that the Department has looked at such weapons. In 1989, the U.S. launched a neutral particle beam into space, as part of an experiment called BEAR, for Beam Accelerator Aboard a Rocket. The experiment report described it as modestly successful: ‘The BEAR flight has demonstrated that accelerator technology can be adapted to a space environment. This first operation of an [neutral particle beam] accelerator in space uncovered no unexpected physics.’ But there’s a big difference between a successful experiment and an affordably deployable weapon. As part of the earlier effort, several companies produced prototype designs. The weapons they sketched were enormous. One was 72 feet long...’We’ve come a long way in terms of the technology we use today to where a full, all-up system wouldn’t be the size of three of these conference rooms, right? We now believe we can get it down to a package that we can put on as part of a payload to be placed on orbit,’ said a senior defense official. ‘Power generation, beam formation, the accelerometer that’s required to get there and what it takes to neutralize that beam, that capability has been matured and there are technologies that we can use today to miniaturize.’” (Pentagon Wants to Test A Space-Based Weapon in 2023, Defense One, March 14, 2019)

[11] The effectiveness of this fighter aircraft for combating enemy missiles depends crucially on its proximity to the target; firstly, it is a very good thing that one’s own armed forces now have these aircraft right on Russia’s borders and, secondly, that the new American aircraft, in which the USA has invested 40 years of development work and 400 billion US dollars and which now outshines everything else in the field, will also be NATO’s aircraft in the future: “In just over ten years, the UK, Italy, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Turkey and Belgium want to have procured more than 500 aircraft. The F-35 will form the backbone of NATO’s air force for decades to come.” (NZZ, March13, 2019) Recently, Poland, Greece, Singapore, Spain and Romania have also been under discussion, while Turkey’s participation has become questionable.

[12] “The new super-fuze for W76-1/Mk4A has a flexible height-of-burst capability that enables it to detonate at any height within the lethal volume over a target....Our conclusions. Under the veil of an otherwise-legitimate warhead life-extension program, the US military has quietly engaged in a vast expansion of the killing power of the most numerous warhead in the US nuclear arsenal: the W76, deployed on the Navy’s ballistic missile submarines. This improvement in kill power means that all US sea-based warheads now have the capability to destroy hardened targets such as Russian missile silos, a capability previously reserved for only the highest-yield warheads in the US arsenal...The result is a nuclear arsenal that is being transformed into a force that has the unambiguous characteristics of being optimized for surprise attacks against Russia and for fighting and winning nuclear wars. While the lethality and firepower of the US force has been greatly increased, the numbers of weapons in both US and Russian forces have decreased, resulting in a dramatic increase in the vulnerability of Russian nuclear forces to a US first strike. We estimate that the results of arms reductions with the increase in US nuclear capacity means that the US military can now destroy all of Russia’s ICBM silos using only about 20 percent of the warheads deployed on US land- and sea-based ballistic missiles. Eventually, super-fuze upgrades will make it possible for every SLBM and ICBM warhead in the US arsenal to perform the hard-target kill missions that were initially envisioned to be exclusively reserved to MX Peacekeeper ICBM warheads. The W76 upgrade reflects a 25-year shift of the focus of US hard-target kill capability from land-based to sea-based ballistic missiles. Moreover, by shifting the capability to submarines that can move to missile launch positions much closer to their targets than land-based missiles, the US military has achieved a significantly greater capacity to conduct a surprise first strike against Russian ICBM silos.” (How US nuclear force modernization is undermining strategic stability: The burst-height compensating super-fuze, Hans M. Kristensen / Matthew McKinzie / Theodore A. Postol, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1, 2017)

[13] “Instead of hundreds of small projectiles from a few thousand feet, Thor used a large projectile from a few thousand miles above the Earth. The “rods from God” idea was a bundle of telephone-pole sized (20 feet long, one foot in diameter) tungsten rods, dropped from orbit, reaching a speed of up to ten times the speed of sound. The rod itself would penetrate hundreds of feet into the Earth, destroying any potential hardened bunkers or secret underground sites. More than that, when the rod hits, the explosion would be on par with the magnitude of a ground-penetrating nuclear weapon – but with no fallout. It would take 15 minutes to destroy a target with such a weapon. One Quora user who works in the defense aerospace industry quoted a cost of no less than $10,000 per pound to fire anything into space. With 20 cubic feet of dense tungsten weighing in at just over 24,000 pounds, the math is easy. Just one of the rods would be prohibitively expensive. The cost of $230 million dollars per rod was unimaginable during the Cold War. These days, not so much.” (These Air Force ‘rods from god’ could hit with the force of a nuclear weapon, B. Stilwell, We are the Mighty, 6.9.17) Today, the USA no longer knows any “prohibitive” costs for its armaments program; it procures the military equipment it deems necessary and simply assumes that it has a unique, virtually unlimited financial power at its disposal, which is in any case superior to all rivals in terms of dimensions.

[14] “What does the Cyber Mission Force do? Today, networks are a warfighting platform and force multiplier for commanders. The CMF ensures commanders can maintain the freedom to operate in the cyber domain and accomplish their missions via three primary avenues:
– Defensive Cyberspace Operations: Missions intended to preserve the ability to use friendly cyberspace capabilities and protect data, networks, net-centric capabilities and other systems
– Offensive Cyberspace Operations: Missions intended to project power in and through cyberspace through the employment of cyberspace capabilities
– Department of Defense Information Network Operations: Missions and tasks to design, build, configure, secure, operate, maintain and sustain the Army portion of the DoD Information Network (DODIN) and supporting networks.” (US Army Cyber Command, February 13, 2018)

Not that the Obama administration was idle on cyber operations – “current and former administration officials say that since at least 2012, the United States has planted spy probes in the Russian electrical grid” – and its cyber warfare accomplishments could not be put to good use. But Trump’s cyber force is expected to make much more of it; with more money, a carte blanche issued by Congress and the president for its combat mission:

“Mr. Trump issued new authorities to Cyber Command last summer, in a still-classified document known as National Security Presidential Memoranda 13, giving General Nakasone [head of the Cyber Mission Force] far more leeway to conduct offensive online operations without receiving presidential approval. But the action inside the Russian electric grid appears to have been conducted under little-noticed new legal authorities, slipped into the military authorization bill passed by Congress last summer. The measure approved the routine conduct of ‘clandestine military activity’ in cyberspace, to ‘deter, safeguard or defend against attacks or malicious cyberactivities against the United States.’ Under the law, those actions can now be authorized by the defense secretary without special presidential approval.” (NYT, June 15, 2019)

At the same time, this combat mission has taken on a new focus: forward defense, as in missile defense:

“But now the American strategy has shifted more toward offense, officials say, with the placement of potentially crippling malware inside the Russian system at a depth and with an aggressiveness that had never been tried before. It is intended partly as a warning, and partly to be poised to conduct cyberstrikes if a major conflict broke out between Washington and Moscow. The commander of United States Cyber Command, Gen. Paul M. Nakasone, has been outspoken about the need to “defend forward” deep in an adversary’s networks to demonstrate that the United States will respond to the barrage of online attacks aimed at it.” (Ibid.)

[15] Shortly after the Russian annexation of Crimea, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden founded a Nordic Defense Cooperation, which, together with the Baltic states, wanted to counter “Russia’s growing aggression” and relied entirely on NATO’s ‘expertise’ for its development. This is primarily aimed at restricting the freedom of movement of Russia’s Baltic and Northern Fleets: Sweden is once again stationing a combat force on the island of Gotland, which was demilitarized after the Cold War, due to growing potential threats; Finland is planning something similar with the Aland Islands; Norway is having the USA and Great Britain send elite troops to better protect its border with Russia, regularly holds maneuvers with the USA in northern Norway on the doorstep of the Russian Northern Fleet, and has had its American friends place a radar called Globus II in its far eastern corner, which has been tested at a Californian air force base for its suitability as part of the missile defence system. “Globus II is so powerful that Norway is financing cable TV for a number of its neighbors because they have interference with their antennas. And in the meantime, Globus 3 is under construction there, which will be significantly larger.” (Telepolis, March 6, 2019)

[16] “First, we’re strengthening NATO’s defense and deterrence posture. Building on our European Reassurance Initiative – which has already increased readiness, from the Baltics to the Black Sea -- our Alliance will enhance our forward presence on our eastern flank.” (Obama at NATO meeting in Warsaw, July 9, 2016)

[17] News Conference by Secretary Mattis at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, defense.gov, October 4, 2018.

[18] The Polish government is planning to spend $4.75 billion on the purchase of the American Patriot defense system alone, with US missile launchers being ordered for a further $400 million; the purchase of the most modern American fighter aircraft at a unit price of $90 million is currently being negotiated. And the construction and maintenance of a permanent American military base in the country would be worth an extra two billion US dollars to the Poles.

Financial problems should not prevent any of the United States’ partners from switching to US weapons. A “European Recapitalization Incentive Program” launched in 2018 is already helping Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Greece, North Macedonia and Slovakia to procure new helicopters and armoured vehicles.“To get the money, countries must get rid of their Russian weapons, promise not to buy new ones, and commit some of their own funding to buying American. ...The countries already approved for funding have militaries that use Soviet-era helicopters and infantry fighting vehicles, according to the International Institute of Strategic Studies’ Military Balance. In some cases, if a country buys parts for these vehicles and helicopters, they could face U.S. Sanctions.... The idea is to start the foreign country toward buying a substantial number of whatever weapons are needed [from us].” (Defense One, May 16, 2019) And the broader idea is not just to make 6 countries interoperable through start-up funding & blackmail, but “to take the effort global” and, incidentally, to break Russian arms exports a bit. (Defense One, May 16, 2019)

[19] Europäische Sicherheit & Technik, October 28, 2018.

[20] “US Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Karem noted that the US has invested more than a billion dollars in security assistance to Ukraine since 2014, and praised Kiev for its efforts to integrate more closely with NATO by increasing ‘interoperability’ – issues ranging from equipment and weapons to training and learning foreign languages to enable smooth cooperation with NATO members.” (RT, October 12, 2018) ”First maneuvers with NATO fighter jets in Ukraine ... ‘Clear Sky 2018’ is the first maneuver on Ukrainian soil in which NATO troops train together with local forces. In addition to Ukraine, Belgium, Great Britain, Estonia, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania and the USA are taking part. Denmark is ... also represented... Despite the predominant participation of members, this is not officially a NATO exercise. According to air force spokesman Yuri Ignat, the main focus of the exercise is to ‘defend the airspace’. The training concentrates on air sovereignty, integration of air and ground forces, air mobility, aeromedical evacuation, cyber defense and personnel rescue, according to the U.S. Air Force. F-15C Eagle fighter jets and C-130J Super Hercules, military transport aircraft and drones have arrived from the USA ... On the Ukrainian side, 30 aircraft are ready for training. According to Russian media reports and analysts, in addition to defending Ukrainian airspace, the NATO fighter jets will also practice evading and combating the Russian S-300 air defense system. The Ukrainian armed forces have numerous versions of the air defense missile system, which was developed during the Soviet era.” (RT, October 12, 2018)

[21] “A lot can be done with a little money: “‘Generous’ gift from the USA: obsolete frigates for Ukraine. The frigates are to be handed over under the ‘Excessive Defense Property’ program. Under this program, the US delivers decommissioned combat equipment to its allies in order to strengthen their defense capabilities and save on scrapping weapons.” (Sputnik, October 22, 2018)

[22] “The Black Sea region is the south-eastern flank of the Alliance. In light of the regional realities and security challenges, NATO has strengthened its deterrence and defense posture with tailored forward presence measures. These are a peacetime demonstration of NATO’s resolve to ensure effective deterrence and credible collective defense. The tailored forward presence measures include a land component – a multinational framework brigade for integrated training – as well as measures for strengthened air and maritime presence in the region. Among the measures announced, the following have already been developed:

– The multinational brigade in Craiova, for which Romania is a framework nation, forms the land component of the forward presence. Currently ten Allies – Bulgaria, Canada, Germany, Spain, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Portugal – have committed to it, contributing to the brigade headquarters and coordinating enhanced training.
– In the air domain, Canada and Italy are reinforcing the efforts of Romania and Bulgaria for air policing.
– In the maritime domain, standing NATO maritime forces are present with more ships and more naval exercises. A Black Sea functional centre has been established within the NATO Maritime Command, which focuses on the regional specific security issues and maintains tight links with the regional navies.
– Last, but not least, a new enhanced training initiative aims to bring more coherence in all training efforts.

Allies have strengthened their focus on areas of increased risk and are engaging with partners in the Black Sea region with the entire spectrum of instruments in their cooperative security toolbox. This includes regular consultations on the strategic assessment of the security situation in the Black Sea region, planning for relevant exercises, and accelerated practical support for Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.” (The Black Sea region: a critical intersection, nato.int, May 25, 2018)

[23] “At the beginning of January, the US missile destroyer ‘Carney’, which is equipped with an Aegis missile defense system, was the first to arrive in the Black Sea this year. In addition to Standard-2 interceptor missiles, 56 Tomahawk cruise missiles are also on board. The British destroyer ‘Duncan’ was last in the Black Sea in July last year, together with the missile cruiser ‘Hue City’ and the destroyer ‘Carney’.” (sputniknews, February 6, 2018)

[24] “In Tokyo, the cabinet of right-wing conservative Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has approved the new defense plan. It provides for record defense spending of the equivalent of 214 billion euros for the period up to March 2024. Among other things, it plans to convert two helicopter carriers so that they can also be used to launch American-designed fighter jets. This would put Japan in possession of aircraft carriers for the first time since the end of the Second World War. The Japanese Izumo class destroyers with a length of 248 meters are currently only designed to transport up to 14 helicopters. In the future, US fighter planes could also take off and land on them. In the coming years, the government wants 42 new fighter jets that can also take off vertically. Observers assume that these will be US F-35B fighter jets. There are also plans to purchase 105 F35A aircraft. These can only take off and land in the conventional manner and are not suitable for use on converted destroyers.” (DW, December 18, 2018) “Other U.S.-made equipment on Japan's shopping list includes two land-based Aegis Ashore air defense radars to defend against North Korean missiles, four Boeing Co KC-46 Pegasus refueling planes to extend the range of Japanese aircraft, and nine Northrop Grumman E-2 Hawkeye early-warning planes.” (Reuters, December 18, 2018)

[25] “Russia is certainly preparing for future conflicts: As part of the expansion of military infrastructure in the Kuril Islands, the Russian Pacific Fleet has deployed missile complexes on the islands of Etorofu-tō and Kunashiri-tō, the fleet's newspaper Boyevaya Vakhta reported on November 22, 2016. As Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced at a meeting of the ministry's board in March, the deployment of Eleron-3 drones is planned for 2016 in addition to the 3K60 Bal and K-300 Bastion missile defense systems.” (japandigest, November 23, 2016)

[26] “‘Japan has already agreed to buy two Aegis Ashore systems, which will provide “essentially national missile defense for Japan,’ Davidson said... The Japanese navy already operates the ship-borne version of the system...According to current plans, the Aegis Ashore units won’t be operational until 2025... ‘While most of Russia’s malign activity occurs in other areas of the world, Russia is indeed increasingly active in the Pacific and it often seeks to block and disrupt the diplomatic efforts of others’ in the region, he said, noting that Moscow has deployed three of its newest ballistic missile submarines to the Pacific over the past several years.” (China Has Built ‘Great Wall of SAMs’ In Pacific, US Adm. Davidson, breaking defense, November 17, 2018)

[27] The growing importance of the region has not escaped the notice of the US Air Force either: “By 2022, Alaska will be home to more advanced fighter jets than any place on Earth.” (defensenews.com, January 9, 2019)

[28] “NATO is working on a broad modernization of the nuclear posture in Europe that involves upgrading bombs, aircraft, and the weapons storage system...The increased accuracy will give the tactical bombs in Europe the same military capability as strategic bombs in the United States. The B61-12 also appears to have some earth-penetration capability, which increases its ability to hold at risk underground targets.” (United States nuclear forces 2019, Hans M. Kristensen / Matt Korda, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 75, April 29, 2019, p. 122-134)

[29] Russia may have violated the INF Treaty. Here’s how the United States appears to have done the same, Theodore A. Postol, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 14, 2019.

[30] “In the future, the medium-range submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) are to be re-armed with nuclear weapons. They will be deployed from submarines and surface ships... With the nuclear weaponization of SLCMs, the Trump administration is reversing Obama’s 2010 decision to abandon nuclear SLCMs. They are not subject to the limitations of the New START Treaty or those of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, even though their ranges are far greater than 500 km. Russia has also retained and modernized its nuclear-capable SLCMs. Nevertheless, the ‘sub-strategic’ nuclear SLCMs can have a strategic effect, as they can reach land targets of vital importance to the enemy from the European or Asian marginal seas. These include air and missile defense positions, command centers, infrastructure or nuclear weapons.” (SWP-Aktuell 15, March 2018, p. 2)

[31] Further explanations on the relationship between the war agenda and dollar credit under Trump can be found in GegenStandpunkt 1-18: The West after one year of Trump.

[32] On American sanctions policy against Russia: “Trump und Putins Russia,” GegenStandpunkt 3-18 [untranslated].

[33] In military conflict over Taiwan or in the Baltics, for example, a U.S.-led coalition would be expected “to have the conventional ability to destroy 300-plus high-value PLA-Navy (PLAN) vessels in the Taiwan Strait, or 2,000-plus Russian armored vehicles in the Baltic region within 72 hours of the start of a conflict. The ability to accomplish the former would allow the coalition to prevent China from using its largest amphibious vessels and other key ships to land their cargos on Taiwan’s beaches. The ability to accomplish the latter would allow NATO to inflict loss rates of 50 percent or more on the first operational echelon of a combined-arms Russian invasion of the Baltic states. Escalation or strategies of attrition and exhaustion may come into play, but – given the asymmetries of interest and lack of unchallenged escalation dominance – the U.S.-led coalition must defend its interests in such a way as place the burden of escalation on China or Russia...” (Why America Needs a New Way of War, Christopher M. Dougherty, Center For a New American Security, June 2019, p. 26)

[34] See “The U.S.A. – World Power Number One,” GegenStandpunkt Verlag, 1979, p. 59 [not online].

[35] “The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, which began in 1969, led to the signing of the so-called SALT I Treaty in Moscow in May 1972. In the long term, the US-Soviet relationship was to be stabilized through legally binding limits on the number and technical improvement of the respective strategic potential.

The SALT II Treaty signed by the USA and the Soviet Union limited the number of strategic systems to 2,400 (on both sides). In addition, the maximum limit of 1320 bombers equipped with cruise missiles and sea- and land-based missiles equipped with multiple warheads was not to be exceeded.” (Wikipedia, Arms control)

[36] “For the first time in history, two complete categories of weapons, namely medium-range missiles and cruise missiles with a range of 500 to 5,000 kilometers, were completely wiped out by means of a real disarmament treaty. Already deployed systems, the operational infrastructure and production base were destroyed.” (Ibid.) For the first time in history, the USSR, with its land-based medium-range missiles, gave up the means of its self-assertion against an existing enemy super-power; the USSR accepted the fact that NATO’s superiority in air- and sea-based short- and medium-range missiles was kept completely out of the INF disarmament negotiations, i.e. remained in place, while the counter-threat with its own land-based SS-20s was eliminated. What the USSR received in return for the elimination of its missiles is NATO’s promise not to deploy any additional land-based missiles, missiles that did not even exist yet – another first: for the first time in history, a state exchanged its weapons for an arms build-up threat. Only a later Kremlin leader really realized that conciliation is not a means of taking one’s rightful place in the competition between states.

[37] “Since 1997, chemical weapons have been officially banned internationally by the Chemical Weapons Convention; their development, production and storage are also prohibited. Nevertheless, the USA remains the largest possessor of chemical warfare agents... On September 27, 2017, it was announced that the last chemical warhead had been destroyed at the Kisner disposal facility in Udmurtia. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons confirmed the destruction of all Russian chemical weapons and congratulated Russia on being chemical weapons-free earlier than originally planned. Russian President Vladimir Putin watched the event via video link and now also called on the USA to respect the agreement and to destroy the American chemical weapons quickly.” (Wikipedia, Chemical weapon)

[38] The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe sets upper limits on the number of heavy weapons systems that may be stationed in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. On this basis, the West is attempting to define the use of such Russian weapons in the Chechen war and in the conflict with Georgia as a breach of the treaty. Which even an American Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, Pentagon chief under Bush Jr. and Obama – long after his term in office, of course – considers to be an exaggeration and clumsiness in arms diplomacy:

“The arrogance of American officials, scientists, entrepreneurs and politicians who had lectured the Russians on how they should conduct their internal and external affairs provoked widespread and lasting hostility and resentment. According to Gates, ‘Putin's hatred of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) was understandable because the negotiations with Russia on it were conducted when it was weak and the treaty limited Russia’s ability to move troops on its own territory. As I later said to Putin, I myself would not tolerate the restriction of my ability to move troops from Texas to California,’ the former Secretary writes.” (sputniknews, Jnuary 16, 2014)

[39] “In April 2010, US President Barack Obama and Russian head of state Dmitry Medvedev signed a treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic nuclear weapons valid until 2020. New Start provides for a reduction in the number of nuclear warheads of both states from 2,200 to 1,550 and a reduction in the number of delivery systems to 800. The verification regime that comes into force with the treaty replaces the START I verification that expired in December 2009.” (Wikipedia, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty)

[40] “‘It’s a great honor to meet President Putin,’ Trump said. ‘We have a very, very good relationship.’” (ntv, June 28, 2019)

[41] As far as arms control in missile defense is concerned, the Missile Defense Review Report 2019 states succinctly:

”The United States will not accept restrictions on the development and deployment of missile defense capabilities.” (MDR, p. x)

With regard to the New START treaty on limiting land-based strategic intercontinental ballistic missiles, which expires in 2021, a brilliant idea has recently been making the rounds in US military circles:

“Air Force Gen. John Hyten, who leads U.S. Strategic Command, was testifying to the Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday. He said that while Russia isn’t technically in violation of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, also called New START, he says that Russia is building new nuclear weapons that should be included, but aren’t. That’s a ‘concern’ and he has little hope of the situation turning around by 2021 when the treaty expires...’I want, ideally, all nuclear weapons to be part of New START, not just the ones that are in the Treaty now,’ he said.” (Defense One, February 26, 2019)

When the Kremlin realizes its sins and allows its new weapons to be negotiated, the general staff also has a lot to gain from arms diplomacy. This might even convince the Commander in Chief, who has long since buried the agreement:

“Just another bad deal that the country made, whether it’s START, whether it’s the Iran deal ... We’re going to start making good deals.” (D. Trump, Reuters, February 23 2017)

[42] “The President: I said I’m going to a few hotspots. We have NATO, then we have the UK, and then we have Putin. And I said, Putin may be the easiest of them all. You never know... Well, he’s a competitor. He’s been very nice to me the times I’ve met him. I’ve been nice to him. He’s a competitor. You know, somebody was saying, ‘Is he an enemy?’ No, he’s not my enemy. ‘Is he a friend?’ No, I don’t know him well enough. But the couple of times that I’ve gotten to meet him, we got along very well. You saw that. I hope we get along well...

Q: Do you consider him as a security threat for Europe or to the U.S.? …

The President: Hey, I don’t want him to be. And that’s, I guess, why we have NATO, and that’s why we have a United States that just had the largest military budget ever – $700 billion approved; $716 billion next year... And Russia – I think getting along with Russia also would be a very good thing.” (Remarks by President Trump at Press Conference After NATO Summit in Brussels / Belgium, whitehouse.gov, July 12, 2018)

[43] “We are stocking up the arsenals of virtually every weapon. We are modernizing and creating a brand new nuclear force. Frankly, we have to do it because others are doing it. If they stop, we'll stop, but they're not stopping. So if they're not going to stop, we're going to be so far ahead of everybody else in nuclear like you've never seen before.” (D. Trump, February 12, 2018)