As soon as ordinary modern people start exchanging viewpoints that claim a certain general validity, either on talk shows, panel discussions or on a private level, it becomes absurd. Example:
A: “An impressive film! The screenwriter hit the nail on the head.”
B: “How? Not at all! It was absolute nonsense.”
A: “For me this film is true. Maybe not for you. In my opinion, it rings true to life.”
“A” makes a mistake that in the theory of knowledge enjoys the honorable title “subjective truth.” The mistake consists of not wanting to admit that the validity as well as non-validity of a thought, a judgment, exists apart from the character of the person. The first indication of this: would “B” otherwise have thought of starting an argument? And the concern of the thing is that it doesn’t even matter to the one who commits the mistake; he is even happy to make it! In all seriousness, he holds to be an expression of his personality. The following is about the embarrassments that go with this.
The mistake consists of simply denying the objectivity of a thought. Every thought – here we talk about thoughts of universal interest, thoughts whose general contents are expressed in the form of a judgment – is objective. This is not a dogma, but a simple statement of the fact that the connection of a sentence subject with a predicate by a verb standing in the indicative – if it is the copula “is” it is a verb already partly containing the predicate – asserts no more and no less than that the connection of the named contents generally exists. Some arbitrary examples: “The element uranium is radioactive”; “Sigmund Freud is the founder of psychoanalysis.” Independently of who can be convinced of the truth of these thoughts, and independently of whether the person expressing the judgment really believes deep down in them: these thoughts are objective by the mode of the indicative, i.e., for example, old Mr. Freud and the founder of psychoanalysis are identical, they are fixed as identical contents. Nothing more is in this sentence: the person who is responsible for this sentence is neither in it with his taste nor with his understanding; he is not found at all.
So it is with every judgment. The subject who judges does not appear in his opinion, even if he still strives badly to – he just judges, nothing more. Even if he talks about himself, then he is just the subject that judges about – here also his judgment has the form of generality, and it does not matter who says it. When modern idiots exchange views they gladly hold the opposite and cannot refrain from giving every judgment an introductory phrase such as: “I think, I believe, I feel, one could perhaps also see it this way ...” All these types of efforts must remain unsuccessful and it does not save them from the always following objectivity: after these empty introductory phrases a “that”-phrase regularly follows – a sentence which contains – exactly – a judgment! And this judgment, which it is surely the point, again contains nothing of the subject.
Hence it is ironic that everyone, even when he is so personally modest, hardly speaks about something before he emphasizes its objectivity, whether he wants to or not.
Now, of course, the fact that one formulates a judgment and announces it in a statement does not guarantee that it is also true. Ultimately, anyone can maintain anything. So reflection is called for. In reflection, not only sentence subject and predicate but their different determinations are set in relationship with each other. In this mental activity, one becomes clear to oneself about which relations exist here in particular. Then the justification for a judgment occurs on account of knowledge about the state of these relations. With all this, as far as one can see, the thinking subject does not come prior, except to the extent that he thinks. The justification is objective. By the way, even if it is wrong. Then it is just objectively wrong.
Strangely enough, the supporters of subjective truth do not want to take this route – frequently difficult – of reflection. Nevertheless, they call their thoughts true and valid, even if only for them – simply due the fact that they think it and find it to be true. They reject the request to put such statements to the test of reason because they are convinced that they have a right to their own observations – not merely to whimsically dismiss a refutation, but to state that what holds privately true for them is universally true.
A strange right. Because first of all surely nobody seriously wants to take this right away from such people: everyone may think whatever they want. One would like to say to them: think whatever you want as long as you don’t bother others with it … Secondly, the will to enjoy this right is the will to hold a contradiction: they want to maintain that their views are already valid, and believe it is a fact that this is the way it is; but they do not want to know whether the strived-for certainty is true. A follower of subjective truth must always reproduce this absurd contradiction over and over again. And he always has to go to the effort of wrapping up his just expressed thoughts, which are free for everyone to evaluate, in the vapors of the personal, re-stating them as if they had not been said – “I only meant ...”
These people never tire of maintaining that their thoughts are simultaneously personal and universal, so this stirs them to state that they have grown fond of their thoughts. But why is this actually? In the end, they are neither nice, nor polite, nor beautiful. No, one can grow fond of them only because they are familiar, they represent a familiar view (!) of things. One can certainly be familiar with total bullshit. Someone who is no longer bothered by the fact that his thoughts could be bullshit does not want to undertake anything more with his thinking. To be nasty: somebody like this has (all by himself) understood that in this great country, according to the criteria of reason, truth counts for nothing. Then one does not understand reason any more as the means for one’s own practical freedom in the strange world in which one lives, to know how to treat the living conditions according to how they benefit one, but as the instrument for an inspection of the world which should remain inconsequential from the start. Put differently: One regards reason not as a means to understand and change the world, but only to interpret it. Then of course it does not matter any more whether one is mistaken when thinking or not, but on whether the inspection of the world shows one’s self-worth and as such gives something to the subject. If the subject gets nothing from his examination, then he wants at least to enjoy it. Thus the former free thinker condemns himself to an existence as a beautiful soul.
In this respect, the beautiful soul who cherishes his subjective truth wants to know this as a truth about himself, the subject. While he has indeed said something, but wants to maintain nothing objective, he no longer offers the thought according to its content, but so as to be interesting as its author. Judgments about the world and its principles become expressions of personality. This is already extremely irrational because “personality” has no other content than the sum of his views. He has selected them himself – and indeed on principle completely at random – and these should constitute the source of his personality and have their criteria in it as well?!
Views become convictions and give rise to authenticity as an ideal: the subject sees his value in the fact that in his judgments he remains faithful to himself and nobody else. And authenticity is a word in great demand.
What does one get from the right to subjective truth? First, an imaginary freedom: the freedom to be allowed to judge by one’s whim. And secondly, an imaginary duty: the obligation of the subject to the task of remaining consistent to oneself. Subjective truth has no more content than this.
By the way: this is still the understanding that he holds. And these are still judgments that he expresses. Yet he treats knowledge here as a matter of taste!!
P.S. Is there then objective truth? Of course not, because the pure contradiction of a mistake is surely only another one. Objective or absolute truth is the fitting idiotic counter-image to subjective truth, namely the image of an existing truth fixed independently of human reasoning. This then would be a higher bullshit ...